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THE RULE OF REASON, WORKABLE COMPETITION,
AND MONOPOLY
GEORGE W. STOCKINGi-
AGITATION for changing the antitrust laws is as old as the laws themselves,
but the intensity of the demand for modification, and its objectives, have
varied. The recent clamor for change culminated in the appointment of the
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. The
most ardent proponents of revision had laid down two principles by which
they would have the Sherman Act interpreted: the rule of reason and the
concept of workable competition.' This article will sketch briefly the develop-
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partment of Economics, Vanderbilt University; co-author (VATxixs), MoNoraL" A-D
FREE ENTERPRisE (1951). The author is indebted to Mrs. Elizabeth R. Post, LLB., Yale
1948, member of the Tennessee Bar, and to Paul T. Bechtol, Jr., graduate assistant in
economics, for their help in preparing this article, and to his colleague, Professor James
W. McKie, for his critical comments.
1. For an exposition of the rule of reason and the concept of workable competition as
modifications of antitrust policy, see Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guide-
posts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 M Ic. L. Rnv. 1139 (1952). The effective-
ness of Oppenheim's demand for change is reflected in his having been made co-chairman
with Judge Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division, of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws.
Endorsement of these principles appears in Smith, Effective Competition: Hypothesis for
Modernizing the Antitrust Laws, 26 N.Y.U.L. REnv 405 (1951) ; U.S. DEP'T OF Cox uCE,
EFEvcrivn ComPErnroN: A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF CoMMExzRcE n His Busmi;Ess
AmsoRy Couxci (1952). See also Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust
Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1948) ; Sunderland, Changing Legal Concepts in the Anti-
trust Field, 3 SvRAcusE L. Rgv. 60 (1951).
Although the demand for a change in the law to comply with the rule of reason and
the concept of workable competition seems to have been the occasion for setting up the
Attorney General's Committee, the Committee carefully avoided recommending that the law
be modified to conform to the theory of workable competition, cautioning that it "does not
provide a standard of legality under any of the antitrust laws." REPORT OF THE ATTo: M
GENERALs'S NATIONAL COMMIT=-. TO STUDY THE AN-TIraUsT LAws 316 (1955). But hav-
ing shut out workable competition at the front door, the Committee brought it in by the
back. It recognized that "it provides the courts with tools of analysis in making the factual
inquiry into problems of competition and monopoly. . ." Ibid. Blackwell Smith, a member
of the Committee, acknowledges more specifically the Committee's endorsement of the
concept of workable competition as a legal standard. He says: "The central concept of
workable or effective competition is described in the Report in terms which parallel very
closely the legal policy statements elsewhere in the Report as to characteristics of acceptable
competition" ; and that out of the report "comes the most realistic set of standards for legal
and socially acceptable competition since the Business Advisory Council Report on Effective
Competition published by Secretary of Commerce Sawyer. The present Report makes more
official a great deal of what was then and there recommended." Trade Practice Bulletin,
May 1955, p. 4.
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ment of these two ideas and analyze their significance to one sector of antitrust
policy, that dealing with industrial consolidation and monopoly.
WORKABLE COMPETITION
Chamberlin's Theory of Monopolistic Competition, published in 1933, one
of the century's really significant contributions to economic thinking, greatly
disturbed students of industrial structure and public policy. Other economists
had noted with concern the impact of two great merger movements 2 on
the structure of the American economy, but few had recognized with Chamber-
lin's insight the significance of structure to economic behavior, and none had
developed a satisfactory theory of monopolistic competition. Chamberlin's
analysis was disturbing in two respects. On the basis of his very rigorous
assumptions 4 he concluded that (1) oligopolists, if they are rational and
take account of both the direct and indirect consequences of their decisions
on prices, will without conspiring behave like monopolists; and (2) although
rivalry among the producers of differentiated products may eliminate monopoly
profits, it will not minimize costs.
No less disturbing than Chamberlin's analysis was the intellectual reaction
to it. Arthur R. Burns, arguing that contemporary industrial structure is
largely a response to modern technology and that its monopolistic character is
therefore inevitable, advocated such a comprehensive program of social con-
trol r -that one of his more severe critics characterized his study as "planning
for totalitarian monopoly." Edwin G. Nourse, similarly arguing that modern
technology decrees business units so large and so few that market forces can-
not be relied on to insure competitive pricing, sought to promote the public
welfare by persuading businessmen that their long-run interests lie not in
charging what the traffic will bear but in passing on to consumers in the form
of lower prices the gains from technological innovation.7 Such measures were
not acceptable to the socialists, who identified the modern industrial structure
with monopoly and advocated for its social control a comprehensive program
of public ownership.
2. Between 1898 and 1904, 239 corporate consolidations of national or regional signifi.
cance, each capitalized for more than $1,000,000 and together covering practically every
important manufacturing industry, took place. Mooo, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUSTS
453-67 (1904). The second merger movement began in 1925, when 554 mining and manu-
facturing firms were merged, and ended in 1929, when 1,245 such firms were merged.
Thorp, The Merger Movenent, in THE STRucruRE OF INDUSTRY, table 1, p. 233 (TNEC
Monograph No. 27, 1941.).
3 JoAiT RoBINsOw, THE ECONOMICS OF ImPEmrFCT COMPrITION (1933), appeared in
England'about the same time. However much it differs from Chamberlin's theory in the
details of its logic, it is an intellectual response to similar institutional developments and
arrives at similar conclusions on the nature of pricing in markets of few sellers.
4. Chamberlin postulated an industrial structure of few sellers, a standardized product,
and identical demand and cost curves known to the sellers. CHAMBERLIN, Tu. THEoRY
OF MONOPOLISTIC CompnTioN 30-31 (6th ed. 1948).
5. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF CoMPETITION cc. 11-12 (1936).
6. Fetter, Planning for Totalitarian Monopoly, 45 J. PoL. EcoN. 95 (1937).
7. NouRs PICF MAKING IN A DEocRAcY (1944).
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Other economists found solace in a new logic. The new logic drew its
inspiration and designation from J. 'M. Clark's paper before the American
Economic Association in December 1939, "Toward a Concept of Workable
Competition." s Clark in pioneering this concept noted what other economists
had observed-that the economists' models of pure and perfect competition
were abstractions to which the realities of the business world do not conform
-and he sought a general concept more ugeful in analyzing markets and
evaluating their economic significance. Recognizing that actual market ar-
rangements are intermediate between those of pure competition and monopoly,
he sought to describe those which are workably competitive. In markets of
workable competition such control as a seller may exert is slight, and under
certain circumstances it may do more good than harm. In any event a market
arrangement, to be workably competitive in Clark's terms, must be economic-
ally more advantageous to the general public than any practically attainable
alternative. Other economists have busied themselves with the concept of
workable competition, and it has become a part of the profession's stock-in-
trade.9 As others have contributed to it the concept has acquired greater
depth and breadth but not greater precision. What it is rapidly coming to
mean is not very different from what economists of an earlier period meant
by the less pretentious term "competition." According to the modernized con-
cept an industry is effectively or workably competitive if market forces-i.e.,
the total influence of independent decisions by buyers and sellers regardless of
their number-provide the drive for technological innovation, the allocation
of resources, the organization of production, and the distribution of income."'
The architects of workable competition, despite the vagueness of the concept,
have laid down certain criteria by which it may be gauged. Most would agree
that in determining the effectiveness or workability of competition in any
particular industry one should examine its structure, the conduct of firms with-
in it, and the performance of the firms and of the industry as a whole. Con-
clusions based on any one of these criteria may be ill-founded, but together
all three criteria may form a logical basis for judgment.
& 30Am.EcoN. Rv.241 (1940).
9. EDwAwDs, MAINTAINING COMP TION 9-10 (1949) ; Adelman, supra note 1; Bain,
Workable Competition in Oligopoly, 40 Am. EcoN. RE%. (Papers and Proccedings of the
American Economic Association) 35 (Supp. 1950); Markham, At Altern atie Approach
to the Concept of Workable Competition, 40 Am. EcoN. Rnv. 349 (1950) ; Mason, .lethods
of Developing a Proper Control of Big Business, 18 AcAh. PoL- Sci. P.oc. 40 (1939);
Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HAnv. L
REv. 1265 (1949); Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 Am. Econ. Rzv. (No.
2 Supp., Pt. 2) 2-3 (1.942) ; i .cox, CoMPErrION AND MON0POLY IN AEmmcAm: IiwusTI
(TNEC Monograph No. 21,1940).
10. Contemporary critics of the theory of "pure" competition criticize that theory-
which is largely of their own invention, they having supplied the qualifying "pure' and the
concept it describes-on the grounds that it is concerned with equilibrium in a static
economy and that it ignores the nature of, and the forces providing, technological inno-
vation. I do not find this a shortcoming of the leading economists of the late nineteenth
century, Marshall and Clark, for example.
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The Structure of an Industry
By an industry's structure economists refer to an industry's make-up, how
it is put together, how its parts are interrelated. How many firms are in it?
What is their relative size? Does a single firm dominate it? How difficult is
the movement of resources into and out of it? What are the limits of its
market? How sharply is it differentiated from other "industries" producing
rival products readily substitutable for the product it makes? Economists
believe that the answers to such questions will throw some light on the
effectiveness or workability of competition.
Where an industry consists of only two or a few firms each producing a
homogeneous product and operating under identical cost conditions, each
fully informed of market conditions and each taking account of the indirect as
well as the direct consequences of its decisions, Chamberlin argued that the
firms will behave like monopolists." That is to say, they will produce the
same amount as a single firm would produce and sell it at the same price.
To insure monopoly behavior the firms need not conspire, but the results will
be the same as though they had conspired. As the number of firms increases,
the likelihood of their behaving like monopolists decreases. Eventually the
number of sellers may become so large that some one (and hence all) will
conclude that he need not take account of the indirect consequences of his
decisions. That is to say, he will behave like a competitor and the result
will be pure competition. Chamberlin recognized that lack of knowledge about
the market or differing interpretations of it might lead to non-monopolistic
behavior, and he was not unaware of the fact that no business situation is
likely to conform exactly to his model.
While Chamberlin's analysis may have convinced some economists that
a market of few sellers is less likely to be workably competitive than a market
of more numerous sellers, it has certainly not convinced all. Adelman, for
example, regards competition as compatible with "many small firms . . .with
a few large ones ... and with large and small ones together."12 Adelman no
doubt expresses the views of many other economists. Clark recognized that
potential competition may afford an effective check on the temptation of oli-
gopolists to exploit their markets.'3 And in any event economists generally
recognize that the absence of a large number of firms is not in all cases a
useful criterion, for in many industries the optimum scale of production is
so large that maximum efficiency decrees a small number of sellers.
When the market for a product is ill-defined, so that the product faces
competition from products so slightly differentiated that they meet almost
identical needs, producers of similar products may serve as an adequate check
on each other in what is loosely regarded as an industry. Whether they do in
fact so check each other will depend on what economists call the cross-elasticity
of demand. Cross-elasticity reflects the extent to which price changes in one
11. CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 49-50.
12. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. R.v. 1289,
1303 (1948).
13. Clark, supra note 8, at 246-47.
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product affect the amount of another product that buyers will buy. Wh'lere
the cross-elasticity of demand for rival products is great, a decline in the
price of one decreases the sale of the other and may lead to a decline in its
price. The production of numerous similar products with a high cross-elas-
ticity of demand may perform about the same economic function as does the
existence of numerous sellers of the same product. Thus rival products may
contribute to the workability of competition, but they do not guarantee it.
Conduct
How firms behave may be more important than structure in determining
the effectiveness of competition, but behavior is a matter about which generali-
zation is hazardous. The vigor of competitive rivalry may depend as much
on the character and aspirations of the executive officers of a firm as on the
industry's structure. Not all businessmen are dedicated to the principle of
maximizing earnings. Some may aspire to earn only a "reasonable" profit;
when they do, other firms may be forced to accept a similar goal. Business
analysts may differ in their opinions as to the effects of price cuts on output
and costs, and they may make different value judgments. Even though firms
may eschew price competition, they do not necessarily forego competitive
rivalry. They may try to improve organizational efficiency and the productive
process, thus reducing costs and perhaps eventually prices as well. Or they
may improve their product or the services supplied with it, thus offering
better goods for the same money.
But in oligopolistic industries business conduct is not necessarily of a
salutary character, and structure itself may shape conduct. Such conduct may
include the sort of predatory practices that the old Standard Oil Trust made
notorious-secret rebating, local price discrimination, espionage, operation of
bogus independents, and the like-but it also includes business practices that
are regarded as sound and ethical by the firms that pursue them. Price
leadership and basing point pricing are illustrations. Although the Chamber-
linian theory of oligopoly points to the conclusion that conspiracy among few
sellers may be unnecessary to insure noncompetitive pricing, few economists
would rely on the theory alone in reaching a conclusion about business be-
havior. Most economists would concede, however, that fewness of sellers
may encourage the development and use of business practices-types of busi-
ness conduct-not consistent with effective competition.
Conduct as the term is here used may refer to neither predatory nor ordinary
business practices, but to the strategy resorted to by a firm in seeking to pro-
tect an advantage it already has. Such strategy or conduct aims at the pro-
tection of a trade secret, a patent, or a superior source of supply, or at block-
ing entrance to an industry or a market. Strategy is the weapon of a firm
operating in an imperfectly competitive market, but resort to strategy is not
necessarily inconsistent with workable competition. As suggested, it may lead
to the improvement of processes and products. It may mean better goods at
lower prices. On the other hand, conduct or strategy that on its face reflects
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
a vigorous rivalry may serve to isolate a producer from the impact of compe-
tition long enough to prevent its being workable.
In short, the conduct of firms alone may be no more satisfactory for de-
termining the effectiveness of competition than structure alone. Just as struc-
ture may reflect itself in conduct, so conduct may reflect itself in performance.
Performance
By performance economists mean the effectiveness or efficiency with which,
from the economic point of view, a firm or industry acquits itself. Is it dy-
namic or lethargic? Is it quick to introduce new methods and improve its
product? What is the course of its prices? Do they reflect reductions in cost
which are rapidly passed on to consumers? What is its rate of profit? Is
"progress" its "most important product"? Does it make "better things for
better living" at prices within the reach of those who desire them ? In measur-
ing performance, as in evaluating conduct, an economist must be careful of his
conclusions. A monopolist may be lethargic or dynamic. A mature industry
may be highly competitive but not progressive. A young industry may display
remarkable vitality even though few firms occupy it. Its rate of return may
merely express the rapid expansion of demand for its products. Contrariwise,
it may reflect monopoly elements.
While no one of these criteria-structure, conduct, performance-is wholly
satisfactory, many economists believe that together they may afford a useful
guide in determining the effectiveness of competition within an industry. Of
course guideposts are no better than the wayfarer's interpretation of them.
Nevertheless a belief in their dependability led the Secretary of Commerce's
Business Advisory Council and others to propose workable or effective com-
petition under a rule of reason as a standard of legality in antitrust cases.'
THE RULE OF REASON
The proposals for modifying the antitrust statutes to require that they be
interpreted and administered in accordance with "the rule of reason" justify
14. U.S. DEV'T OF ComwERcE, EFFEcnvE COMPETITION: A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY
OF COMMERCE BY His BusINEss AD VISORY COUNCIL (1952). Some students of antitrust
have a different notion of the concept of workable competition from that expounded above.
Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust
Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1160 (1952), seems to imply that the workability of any
particular industrial arrangement should be judged not only by its effect on competition
but also by its effect on public welfare. He says: "In particular factual situations, evidence
of legal, economic, and social justifications [should] . . . be weighed under close judicial
scrutiny to arrive at a determination of whether the restrictions are reasonable or un-
reasonable when measured against the effects upon competition." I understand this to
mean that arrangements may be economically and socially justifiable even though they
restrict competition, and if they are, the restriction should be regarded as reasonable.
Smith, supra note 1, at 419, is equally obscure. He says: "Public policy should be in favor
of such joint or group activities in so far as they advance tendencies toward more and
better goods and services for more people in proportion to human efforts ......
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reconsideration of the derivation of the principle, its use at common law, the
intent of Congress about it, and the courts' interpretation and application of it.
The principle is old. As applied to restraints of trade it developed in com-
mon law litigation growing out of private contracts. There the term "restraint
of trade" had a technical meaning.'0 It was used to characterize agreements
not to compete between buyers and sellers of property, partners in a joint
enterprise, apprentices and masters, and the like. For example, a buyer of a
business wished to protect himself against the seller's future competition, or
a seller of part of a business wished to protect the part he retained from the
buyer's new competition. In consideration of the sale the buyer or the seller
agreed not to compete in such a way as to detract from the value of the
property retained or sold. Such contracts involved a restraint of trade. They
also involved a restriction on competition,10 but neither English nor American
legislatures oulawed them by statute. Contracts in restraint of trade first came
before the courts only when one of the parties violated the contract. When the
injured party resorted to litigation, the courts had to decide whether the
contract was enforceable. In the early history of such contracts the English
courts held that all of them were void because contrary to the public interest in
two ways: they deprived an individual of a means of livelihood, and they de-
prived the public of his talents. 7
But as trade and industry expanded in England and the obstacles to entry
became less formidable; as the customs and laws governing British economic
life, especially the laws of apprenticeship, were relaxed; as workmen moved
more freely from one occupation to another; as the opportunities for con-
tractual employment expanded; as freedom under contract replaced security
based on status; and as the means of communication and transportation im-
proved and markets broadened, the courts modified the common law by distin-
guishing between reasonable and unreasonable restraints on trade.18 In passing
15. For a somewhat similar view of the law on restraint of trade and of the develop-
merit of the rule of reason, see WATrINS, INDUsTRIAL COsMMNATIONS AND PuLIc POLICY
224-27 (1927); Handler, Restraint of Trade, 13 ENcYc. Soc. ScL 33941 (1934).
16. They have no significance in a purely competitive market. No wheat farmer in
selling a farm ever agrees as part of the bargain that he will not compete with the purchaser
in raising and selling wheat. Contracts to "restrain trade" have meaning only where
products are differentiated, sellers are few, or special skills or trade secrets are involved.
17. Apparently the earliest recorded case of a contract in restraint of trade is Dyer's
Case, Y.B., 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (1415), in which the court not only refused to enforce
a bond conditioned on the defendant's not practising his trade as a dyer in the plaintiff's
town for six months but threatened: "[A]nd by God, if the plaintiff were here he should
go to prison till he had paid a fine to the king." In Colgate v. Bacheler, Cro. Eli. 872,
78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (K.B. 1601), the defendant's bond to pay i20 if he should use the trade
of a haberdasher in certain cities was held void: "[I]t was resolved by the Court, that
this condition is against law, to prohibit or restrain any to use a lawful trade at any time,
or at any place; for as well as he may restrain him for one time or one place, he may
restrain him for longer times and more places, which is against the benefit of the common-
wealth; for being freemen, it is free for them to exercise their trade in any place."
18. A contract restraining a joiner from practising his trade for a certain time (twenty-
one years) and in a certain place (the city of London) was upheld early in the seventeenth
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judgment on the reasonableness of restrictive contracts, they re-examined the
nature of the transaction from the two points of view from which they had
originally condemned them: the protection of the parties and the protection of
the public.19 In determining whether the individuals had been injured they
looked to the consideration binding the contract. In determining whether the
public interest had been hurt they considered the seriousness of the restfictiols
on competition. Where there was a legal consideration for the restraint and
the restrictions on competition were not regarded as oppressive, the courts
came to uphold such contracts. 20 This was the common law rule of reason,
developed in the English courts and adopted in America.
21
century. Rogers v. Parrey, 2 Bulst. 136, 80 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1614). Broad v. Jollyfe,
Cro. Jac. 596, 79 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1621), held that "for a valuable consideration, and
voluntary, one may agree that he will not use his trade." But Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.
Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711), is the leading case on testing the validity of a
restraint of trade by its reasonableness. The seller of a bakery who had given his bond for
£50 not to practise his trade within the parish for five years resumed his trade and defended
himself against the buyer's action for debt on the ground that the restraint was void. It was
resolved by the court: "And we are all of opinion, that a special consideration being set
forth in the condition, which shews it was reasonable for the parties to enter into it, the
same is good. . . ." The court also distinguished between general restraints "not to exercise
a trade throughout the kingdom," which were "of no benefit to either party, and only
oppressive," and those "limited to a particular place," which were good. Id. at 182, 24 Eng.
Rep. at 348.
19. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 190, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (Ch. 1711). Chief
Justice Parker pointed out another danger in restrictive contracts: "the great abuses these
voluntary restraints are liable to; as for instance, from corporations, who are perpetually
labouring for exclusive advantages in trade, and to reduce it into as few hands as pos-
sible ... ." Ibid.
20. Some courts in upholding contracts imposing partial restraints on trade declared
that only a partial restraint supported by a consideration which the court found adequate
was valid. Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322, 327, 130 Eng. Rep. 537, 539 (C.P. 1825). Others
said that the court need not weigh the reasonableness of the consideration so long as it
was a legal one. Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & E. 438, 112 Eng. Rep. 167 (Ex. 1837). In
1837 the Exchequer Chamber upheld a general restraint (a carrier's agreement not to
engage in his trade but to become an assistant to the defendants for the rest of his life),
saying that a general restraint is good if made on sufficient consideration "and the public
gain some advantage." Wallis v. Day, 2 M. & W. 273, 281, 150 Eng. Rep. 759, 762 (Ex.
1837). Sometimes an unreasonably extensive restraint was held invalid while the reason-
able portions of the same contract were upheld. Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W. 653, 152 Eng.
Rep. 967 (Ex. 1843) (dentist's agreement not to practise in London held good, but his
agreement not to practise in any towns or places in England or Scotland where plaintiffs
had practised, bad). In 1869 an agreement not to engage in the leather cloth business any-
where in Europe was upheld, the court saying that public policy enables a man "to enter
into any stipulation however restrictive it is, provided that restriction in the judgment of
the Court is not unreasonable, having regard to the subject matter of the contract." Leather
Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L.R. 9 Eq. 345, 354 (1869). And in Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch.D.
351 (1880), the court upheld a champagne salesman's general contract not to deal in
champagne for ten years, saying that the invalidity of all general restraints of trade had
never been the law of England.
21. E.g., Pike v. Thomas, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 486 (1817) ; Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19
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In evaluating the significance of this development it is important to keep
in mind that the contracts whose reasonableness was initially in question were
ancillary to transactions whose legality was not in dispute. During the latter
part of the nineteenth century rival businessmen with increasing frequency
contracted to restrict or eliminate competition among themselves. These ar-
rangements were not incidental to contracts whose legality was beyond ques-
tion. They were not designed to protect an individual in purchasing property
or teaching a trade; they were aimed at market control. Their object was
to lessen the severity of competition among business rivals or to monopolize
markets. When injured parties brought suit against offenders who violated
such contracts, the courts, confronted with a different kind of restraint on
trade, sought refuge in the old doctrine.22 But in resorting to the rule of
reason they did not always apply it in the same way.
Courts and commentators have disagreed about the way the common law
rule of reason was applied to contracts whose purpose was market control.
judge Taft (later Chief Justice), in his review of the common law on restraint
of trade in the Addystn Pipe and Steel Company case,3 concluded that the
courts had generally held void all contracts having the sole object of restrain-
ing competition. Courts that had held otherwise, he contended, by assuming
"the power to say ... how much restraint of competition is in the public in-
terest, and how much is not" had "set sail on a sea of doubt."2 4 Five years
earlier judge Sanborn, in deciding the Trans-Missouri Freight Assodation
Pick.) 51 (1837) ; Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15, 19-20 (1873). In 1873 the Supreme
Court upheld a buyer's contract not to use a certain steamer in California waters or on the
Columbia River and its tributaries for ten years, saying: "In order that it may not be un-
reasonable, the restraint imposed must not be larger than is required for the necessary pro-
tection of the party with whom the contract is made." Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v.
Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 67 (1873). And in Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106
N.Y. 473, 482, 13 N.E. 419 (1887), the court upheld a ninety-nine year contract not to
manufacture or sell friction matches in the United States except in Nevada and Montana,
saying: "If [a mar's] ... business extends over a continent, does public policy forbid his
accompanying the sale with a stipulation for restraint co-extensive with the business which
he sells?"
22. While ostensibly applying the principles of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wris. 181, 24
Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711), or other ancillary contract cases, some English and American
courts sustained contracts designed only to divide territories, raise prices, control markets,
or prevent competition. Wickens v. Evans, 3 Y. & J. 318, 148 Eng. Rep. 1201 (Ex. 1829)
(agreement between three competing trunk and box manufacturers to assign markets in
England and Wales, not to pay in Oxford more than 6d. or 8d. for any tea chest, and to
meet for mutual assistance if outside competition arose) ; Collins v. Lock, 4 App. Cas. 674
(1879) (agreement by four stevedoring firms to divide the business at the port of Mel-
bourne); Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123 (Wis. 1851) (an exclusive dealing contract be-
tween a grain dealer and a warehouseman, one of a series by which grain dealers were
seeking full control of the Milwaukee wheat market) ; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519,
18 N.E. 363 (1888) (steamship corporation's contract to pay another not to compete).
23. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1893), m:odified
and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
24. Id. at 85 Fed. 271,284 (6th Cir. 1898).
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case in the district court,25 had reviewed the common law and reached a con-
trary conclusion. He found that at common law only pooling contracts among
competing common carriers, or contracts or combinations to restrict or mon-
opolize supply or to raise prices or pool profits among producers or dealers in
"staple commodities of prime necessity to the people," were illegal restraints
of trade ;26 but contracts "between common carriers which imposed some re-
strictions upon competition have been frequently sustained by our highest
courts, and the rule has been often applied that the test of their validity was
not the existence, but the reasonableness, of the restriction imposed."2 7 Hand-
ler, after reviewing the cases and the commentators, recognizes three trends
in the authorities before 1890: (1) The prevailing view was that contracts
among business rivals that restrained or eliminated competition were unlawful
per se. (2) Some jurisdictions, finding the contracts before them so limited
in scope as to be ineffective, reached the somewhat anomalous conclusion
that they were therefore enforceable. (3) Other coutts, seemingly lacking
faith in competition as a regulator of economic activity, found price-fixing
agreements valid when the prices were designed not to exploit the public but
to rectify "intolerable industrial conditions." 28 Thorelli 29 suggests that the
conflicts in common law decisions may have been due in part to a divergence
in English and American public policy toward restrictive arrangements, which
developed in the nineteenth century:
"In the course of the 19th century the doctrine of restraint of trade
was extended to cover, ultimately, restrictions on trade in general. It is
in this broad sense that it has been of such great significance in the de-
velopment of American antimonopoly policies. Whereas the extension
of the restraint of trade concept in England marked the beginning of a
25. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 Fed. 58 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd,
166 U.S. 290 (1897).
26. Id. at 58 Fed. 58, 69 (8th Cir. 1893).
27. Id. at 74. Judge Sanborn said that the reason contracts of the kinds he described
were held void was that their "main purpose ... is to suppress, not simply to regulate,
competition. . . ." Id. at 69. Peppin, Price-Fixing Agreements under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 297, 667 (1940), supports Judge Sanborn's interpretation,
His thesis is that the common law always upheld agreements directly affecting prices with-
out directly fixing them, and that beginning early in the nineteenth century nonancillary
agreements eliminating price and all other competition between the parties were upheld If
reasonable. He says that while the early cases invalidating price-fixing agreements did
not refer to them as restraints of trade, "it would seem clear that such was the real ob-
jection.... ." Id. at 324.
28. HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF TE FEDEAL
ANTITRUST LAWs 4-5 (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941).
29. THoRE.LLr, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1.955), came off the press as this
article was being completed. Although written by a Swedish scholar, this work gives the
most comprehensive, detailed, and penetrating analysis yet to appear of the legal, economic,
social, and political background of the Sherman Act and its administration through 1903.
Of the significance of the common law he says: "It was the belief, common in the 17th
and quite general in the 18th and 19th centuries, that the conmon laic 'always' had been
opposed to monopolies, or even actively favored competition, rather than an inherently
antimonopolistic quality in its relevant doctrines that proved important." Id. at 51.
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continuous relaxation of public policy, American courts moulded the
broadened doctrine into a useful, if imperfect, general antimonopoly in-
strument. And whereas the 'rule of reason,' adopted from the 'narrow'
restraint of trade doctrine, was used to implement the gradual weakening
of the extended doctrine in England, there ,%as relatively little use of it
in this new field in the United States."30
With the courts and the commentators thus in disagreement a layman may
reasonably conclude that the common law on restrictions of competition was
inconsistent and confused.
The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act, many commentators unwittingly imply, was designed to
perpetuate this confusion. The record reads differently. To understand the pur-
pose of the Sherman Act one must understand the temper of the times that gave it
birth. The decade of the 1880's was the heyday of the trusts. The Standard
Qil Trust, the Cottonseed Oil Trust, the Linseed Oil Trust, the National
Lead Trust, the Whiskey Trust, the Sugar Trust were all of this era. The
power of these great combines, and the predatory practices by which they
achieved or perpetuated their power, greatly disturbed consumers who bought
their products, businessmen who confronted them as rivals in the market,
politicians elected to promote the public welfare, and students of industrial
structure and business behavior. This anxiety was reflected in contemporary
professional and popular literature 31 and in political convention halls. Both
the Democratic and the Republican parties in their 1888 platforms scathingly
condemned combinations that controlled markets and exploited consumers;a
and the Democrats, more specific than their political rivals, declared their faith
in Adam Smith's "obvious and simple system of natural liberty"--or as they
called it, "natural competition."'
Senator Sherman, although he wrote not a word of the act that bears his
name,34 appropriately has been regarded as its father. It is Senate Bill No. 1,
30. Id. at 52-53.
31. E.g., Barry, The Moloch of Monopoly, 7 The Forum 436 (1889) ; Hudson, Modcrn
Feudalii, 144 The North American Review 277 (1,QS7) ; Wood, The Bugbcar of Trusts,
5 The Forum 584 (1888); Editorial, Trusts and Confidences, 44 The Nation 380 (1887).
In the professional journals appeared such articles as Gunton, The Economzic and Social
Aspects of Trusts, 3 PoL Sci. Q. 385 (1888); Hadley, Private Monopolics and Public
Rights, 1 Q. J. Eco-N. 28 (1886).
32. The Republicans declared their "opposition to all combinations of capital, organized
in trusts or otherwise, to control arbitrarily the condition of trade among our citizens;
and.., all schemes to oppress the people by undue charges." McKEE, THE NA .,'A.
CoxvENTioNs AND PLAToa.s OF ALL Poi~cAL PAmrms 241, (1906). The Democrats
asserted: "[T]he interests of the people are betrayed when, by unnecessary ta-ation, trusts
and combinations are permitted to exist, which, while unduly enriching the few that com-
bine, rob the body of our citizens by depriving them of the benefits of natural competition."
Id. at 235.
33. Ibid.
34. See WALYER, HisToRy OF THE SHEMMAN LAW 2 (1910) ; Hornblover, "Antitrust"
LegislatioL and Litigation, 11 CoLuII. L. REv. 701 (1911). See also Bmuu.x-, LAton An,
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introduced by Sherman in the first session of the Fifty-first Congress on De-
cember 4, 1889, and the congressional debates on it, that reveal what Senator
Sherman and Congress were aiming at. Sherman apparently wanted Congress
to go as far as it could in outlawing arrangements that restricted competition.
But a ban by Congress on contracts to restrain competition had to be brought
within its constitutional power to regulate commerce among the states and
with foreign countries. Section 1 of the Sherman bill indicated its twofold
purpose: to outlaw as far as it could all arrangements that limited competition
and at the same time to keep the ban within the jurisdiction of Congress. 31
Two substitute bills offered in the Senate grappled with these twin prob-
lems of comprehensiveness and constitutionality."0 The debates on these sev-
eral measures reflected continuing doubt on both scores, and Senator Sherman
made it clear that he did not believe that the proposed bills presented a new
principle of law, but rather that they banned by federal statute what the states
had banned by statute or at common law.37 Sherman's statements on this
issue may raise some question about his knowledge of the common law,88 but
they raise no doubt about his intentions and in no way restrict the meaning
THE SHERMAAN AcT c. 3 (1930); McLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS OF TIiE
UNITED STATES 7, 18-25 (1933); and especially THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLIcY 210-14 (1955).
35. Section 1 provided:
"That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between
persons or corporations made with a view or which tend to prevent full and free
competition in the importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported into the
United States, or in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic
growth or production, or domestic raw material that competes with any similar
article upon which a duty is levied by the United States, or which shall be trans-
ported from one State or Territory to another,. . . are hereby declared to be against
public policy, unlawful, and void."
21 CONG. REc. 1765 (1890). The antitrust bills introduced in the 50th Congress on August
14, 1888, by Senator Sherman, S. 3445, 19 CONG. REc. 7513, and Senator Reagan, S. 3440,
19 CONG. REc. 7512, had shown similar purposes. Despite the circumlocutions of S. 1, 51st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1889), Senator George of Mississippi challenged its constitutionality on
the ground, among others, that it proposed to regulate manufacture and production within
a state. 21. CONG. REc. 1768 (1890).
36. A substitute bill presented by the Senate Finance Committee on March 21, 1890,
limited its scope to contracts, etc., between parties in different states or with foreigners,
but banned all arrangements made with "a view or which tend to prevent full and free
competition." 21 CONG. REc. 2455 (1890). Senator Reagan of Texas offered a substitute
for the substitute which defined trusts comprehensively, including any arrangement that
prevented competition or restricted trade. 21 id. at 2455-56.
37. "It does not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized
principles of the common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal
Government. Similar contracts in any State in the Union are now, by common or statute
law, null and void." 21 CoNG. REc. 2456 (1890). Sherman reviewed at length a number
of recent state cases holding combinations to prevent competition illegal and of no effect
and said he might add "innumerable" others. 21 id. at 2458-59.
38. See text at note 28 supra for Handler's classification of common law principles;
cf. Peppin's views, note 27 supra.
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of the language by which he proposed to outlaw arrangements that substituted
collusion for competition in the market place.20
On March 27, 1890, the Senate referred the antitrust bill to the Committee
on the Judiciary.40 Instructed to report with-in twenty days, the committee did
so within a week. It 6ffered as a substitute for the original Sherman bill a
bill which passed the Senate with only one dissenting vote,4 1 which passed the
House with no dissent,4' and which with President Harrison's signature on
the second of July became the Sherman Act.43 The language of the Sherman
39. Senator Sherman stated to the Senate: "Mr. President, the object of this bill, as
shown by the title, is 'to declare unlawful trusts and combinations in restraint of trade and
production.' It declares that certain contracts are against public policy, null and void."
21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890). Sherman also described his bill as "a remedial statute to en-
force by civil process in the courts of the United States the common law against monopolies."
21 id. at 2461. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL AxNrrmusT PoLicE 228 (1955), concludes that
"there is ample evidence that not only the bills reported by Sherman in the 51st Congress
but also the bill finally passed were intended by their sponsors primarily to be federal
codifications of the common law of England and the several states." But it is apparently
the common law as applied by courts to hold unlawful contracts to restrict competition
and block the operation of market forces that Thorelli has in mind, for he asserts and
reiterates, "Congress believed in competition." Id. at 226. "There can be no doubt," he says,
"that Sherman's views were typical in the sense that the vast majority of congressmen
were sincere proponents of a private enterprise system founded on the principle of 'full
and free competition." Ibid.
40. 21 CONG. REc. 2731. (1890).
41. 21 id. at 3153.
42. 21 id. at 6314. Despite the unanimity with which Congress acted, sume scholars
contend that it was not seriously concerned with the monopoly problem. CLnAMi, ThE
FEDERAL TRuST POLTCY 30 (1931), states that the "brief consideration of the bill in the
Senate and the cavalier handling of it in the House are cogent proofs that the legislators
themselves were not greatly aroused by any 'trust peril."' F,%isoD & GonnoN, GoVEMN-
MENT AND THE AmEFUcAN Ecoxomy 450 (1941), say: "While hindsight justly views it as
one of the most important measures ever passed by Congress, it is doubtful if any member
of the 51st Congress so thought of it." An examination of the Congressional Recurd
creates a different impression. The persistence with which the legislators considered it and
the language they used in discussing it indicate grave concern about the trust problem. In
the first session of the 50th Congress, Senators introduced four bills designed to deal with
the trust problem and in the House twelve similar bills were introduced. 19 CoNGa. REc.
passim (1888). Senator Sherman's bill, S. 3445, was debated on three occasions in the
second session of the 50th Congress. 20 CONG. REc. 1120, 1167, 1457-62 (1889). In the
first session of the 51st Congress, Senators Sherman, George, and Reagan introduced three
antitrust bills (including S. 1, later rewritten into the Sherman Act); Senator Turpie
introduced a resolution to include in the proposed penal enactments against trusts a pro-
vision for the seizure of "trust goods," 21 CoNG. REc. 125 (1890) ; and Senator George
introduced a joint resolution to amend the Constitution to enable Congress to prohibit
combinations in restraint of trade, S.R. 67, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890). Its counterpart,
H. REs. 30, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890), xwas introduced in the House of Representatives,
where members also introduced eighteen bills to outlaw trusts as variously defined or
trusts in specific industries, such as cattle. 21 CONG. REc. passim (1890). In debating
these measures many Congressmen expressed with fervor their condemnation of monopolies
and trusts.
43. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
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Act was wholly different from the langauge of the initial Sherman bill, but
nothing in the Congressional Record indicates that its purpose was not the
same.44 It apparently aimed, as had its predecessors, to go as far as the juris-
diction of Congress permitted in banning every restriction on competition.
4 1
As Congressman Stewart of Vermont put it, "The provisions of this trust bill
are just as broad, sweeping, and explicit as the English language can make
them to express the power of Congress over this subject under the Constitution
of the United States."'46 The new language eliminated all doubt about juris-
diction, but despite Mr. Stewart's characterization it started a debate about
scope that has continued until today.
The Rule of Reason and Monopoly
The debate was precipitated in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association
case, 47 when Justice Peckham and a majority of the Supreme Court held
that the language of the Sherman Act meant what it said-that the law banned
every contract that restrained trade, regardless of form, and every conspiracy
to achieve this end. Justice White and three other Justices dissented, and in
doing so reviewed the common law rule of reason.48 Fourteen years later Chief
Justice White, writing for a majority in the 1911 Standard Oil decision, con-
44. Senator Hoar explained the bill's purpose as follows:
"The complaint which has come from all parts and all classes of the country of
these great monopolies, which are becoming not only in some cases an actual injury
to the comfort of ordinary life, but are a menace to republican institutions them-
selves, has induced Congress to take the matter up. . . . Now, the Judiciary Com-
mittee has carefully and as thoroughly as it could agreed upon what we believe
will be a very efficient measure, under which one long forward step will be taken
in suppressing this evil. We have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law in
regard to all interstate and international commercial transactions, and have clothed
the United States courts with authority to enforce that doctrine by injunction."
21 CoNG. REc. 3146 (1890).
45. Section 1 outlaws "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations"; and § 2 makes guilty of a misdemeanor "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations." (Emphasis supplied.) 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (1937),
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
46. 21 CONG. REc. 6314 (1890).
47. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). "When,..
the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or combination in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, etc., the plain and ordinary meaning of such lan-
guage is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of
trade, but all contracts are included in such language, and no exception or limitation can
be added without placing in the act that which has been omitted by Congress." Id. at 328.
48. White noted the law's progression from Dyer's Case, Y.B., 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26
(1415), through Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711), to
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535, in which the
House of Lords ruled that the old distinction between partial and general restraint was
an incorrect criterion and that the true test was whether, considering all the circumstances,
[Vol. 64:11071120
THE RULE OF REASON
cluded that Congress had not outlawed all contracts that restrained trade but
only those that unreasonably restrained it ;49 despite the fact that two years
earlier, with the issue before it, Congress had refused to modify the statute'O
and despite the fact that White identified restraint of trade with restriction of
competition,51 as Congress had done. Thus, recognizing that Congress in-
tended to give a broad new meaning to the term "restraint of trade," White
nevertheless read into it the rule of reason which had qualified the original
common law use of the term.
If Congress had used "restraint of trade" in its narrow technical meaning
as a contractual limitation on the right of a seller of property, a participant in
a partnership, or an apprentice to exercise his trade, and if it had been guided
by either common sense or precedent, it must certainly have distinguished be-
tween reasonable and unreasonable restraint. But seeking as it was to pre-
serve a competitive society, Congress was under no obligation to make such a
distinction. In truth, in outlawing every restriction on competition it did all
that it could do but no more than was necessary to achieve its objective.0
the contract was reasonable or unreasonable. "If reasonable, it was not a contract in re-
straint of trade, and if unreasonable, it was." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,347 (1897).
49. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). White reasuned that (1)
the context of the Sherman Act "manifests that [it] . .. was drawn in the light of the
existing practical conception of the law of restraint of trade," since it ignores the early
precise meaning of contracts in restraint of trade and includes under that term contracts
or acts designed to monopolize as well; and (2) because many new forms of contract and
combination were evolving from changing economic conditions, Congress "by an all-em-
bracing enumeration" had sought "to make sure that no form of contract or combination
by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign commerce vas brought about could
save such restraint from condemnation. The statute under this view evidenced the intent
not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether resulting from combina-
tion or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but to
protect that commerce from being restrained by methods, whether old or new, which would
constitute an interference that is an undue restraint." Id. at 59-60.
50. S. 6440, 60th Cong., Zd Sess. (1909), would have amended the Sherman Act to
provide, among other things, that no prosecutions under its first six sections should be
maintained for past offenses unless the contract or combination was in unreasonable re-
straint of trade. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary rejected this proposal, saying
that to make "civil and criminal prosecution hinge on the question of reasonableness or
unreasonableness ... destroys ... the provisions of the act as to criminal prosecutions,
and renders them nugatory, and opens the door wide to doubt and uncertainty as to civil
prosecutions.... The defense of reasonable restraint would be made in every case and
there would be as many different rules of reasonableness as cases, courts, and juries." S.
REP. No. 848, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11 (1909).
51. White described the purpose and nature of the law on restraint of trade as follows:
"[T]he dread of enhancement of prices and of other wrongs which it was thought
would flow from the undue limitation on competitive conditions caused by contracts
or other acts of individuals or corporations, led, as a matter of public policy, to the
prohibition or treating as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably re-
strictive of competitive conditions.....
Id. at 58.
52. The first Sherman Act case before the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that
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Many students of the law and economics of monopoly argue that the courts
have been forced to adopt a rule of reason in applying the Sherman Act. If
by this they mean that courts must exercise discretion and judgment, after
considering all the relevant facts, in determining whether a contract restrains
or promotes competition,"3 they are right. If they mean that it is a proper
judicial function to determine to what extent competition may be impaired by
contract without harming the public interest,5 4 I believe they are wrong. More
important, they would impose on the courts, which must undertake the una-
voidable task of determining whether a contract does in fact impair competi-
tion, the additional burden of determining whether contracts that impair
competition do so unreasonably. To determine how much restriction on com-
petition by private enterprise can be justified on economic grounds is an almost
insuperable task, even for economists.
In the Standard Oil case it was important that Chief Justice White find an
easy way to answer an insoluble problem. To determine whether the Standard
Congress had not done enough. The Court construed the statute as applicable only to
combinations to monopolize interstate commerce, not to combinations within one state to
monopolize the manufacture of a product sold in interstate commerce. United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895). This drastic limitation of the law's scope, together
with the Court's assertion that "Congress did not attempt ... to assert the power to deal
with monopoly directly as such; or to limit and restrict the rights of corporations created
by the States ... or to make criminal the acts of persons in the acquisition and control of
property which the States of their residence or creation sanctioned," id. at 16, apparently
gave the Great Combination Movement approved legal status just as it was getting under
way. Beginning with Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), how-
ever, the Supreme Court receded from its narrow conception of Congress' power over
interstate commerce.
53. Certain passages in the 1911 Standard Oil opinion read as if this is what Chief
Justice White meant. In answering the Government's contention that the Sherman Act
embraces every contract, etc., in restraint of trade and "imposes the plain duty of applying
its prohibitions to every case within its literal language," White declared that this inter-
pretation erred in assuming the matter to be decided, since judgment must be exercised
to determine whether a particular act falls within the statutory classes and if it does
whether its nature or effect makes it "a restraint of trade within the intendment of the
act." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911). Oppenheim, Federal
Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Micu. L.
REv. 1139, 1.176-77 (1952), at times seems to have a similar conception of the rule of
reason. He says: "When all relevant economic and factual data are considered, the Rule
of Reason enables a judgment to be made regarding the effects of any arrangement in
resolving the question whether it promotes more competition than it restrains, or the
reverse." At other times he seems to mean something quite different. See note 54 infra.
54. Oppenheim's most elaborate exposition of the significance of the rule of reason
implies this. He would have proof of "a restrictive agreement alleged to be in violation
of the antitrust laws" constitute a prima facie case of illegality which the respondent might
answer by showing "justification within the allowable limits of the antitrust statutory
standards," whereupon the court would "apply the Rule of Reason to the entire record";
that is, he would exercise discretion in evaluating the evidence "to arrive at a value judg-
ment" which apparently could include toleration of "restrictions of joint conduct" "in In-
dividualized situations where there are overriding legal, economic and social justifications"
for them. Oppenheim, supra note 53, at 1159, 1161. (Emphasis added.)
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Oil Company's officers and subsidiaries had combined or conspired to restrain
trade, the Supreme Court looked to their motives. To determine motives the
Court examined their conduct. As this discussion has indicated, an appraisal
of conduct broadly conceived is not irrelevant to economic considerations, but
it is not a substitute for them, particularly where conduct is judged primarily
by ethical standards. But since the task which the Court had set itself was
beyond its capacities, this standard was about the oly one open to it.
The Court found that Standard Oil had relentlessly absorbed its rivals or
ruthlessly driven them out of business. In shipping oil it had obtained dis-
criminatory rebates; in selling oil it had resorted to discriminatory pricing. In
combatting rivals it had engaged in espionage; in selling petroleum products
it had practiced deceit.r 5 The Court concluded that
"no disinterested mind can survey the period in question without being
irresistibly driven to the conclusion that the very genius for commercial
development and organization which it would seem was manifested from
the beginning soon begot an intent and purpose to exclude others which
was frequently manifested by acts and dealings wholly inconsistent with
the theory that they were made with the single conception of advancing
the development of business power by usual methods, but which on the
contrary necessarily involved the intent to drive others from the field
and to exclude them from their right to trade and thus accomplish the
mastery which was the end in view." 0
In applying the rule of reason in the American Tobacco case 5- the Court
again looked to motives, and to determine motives it examined conduct. In
finding American Tobacco's behavior reprehensible the Court was even more
explicit in making illegality synonymous with bad conduct. The Court reason-
ed that in view of "the undisputed facts . . . , it remains only to determine
whether they establish that the acts, contracts, agreenents, combinations, etc..
which were assailed were of such an unusual and wrongfid character as to
bring them within the prohibitions of the law."513 The Court found that they
were. In truth it found an "ever-present manifestation . . . of a conscious
wrongdoing." 59 Such were the primary grounds on which it concluded that
the Standard Oil and American Tobacco Companies had violated the Sher-
man Act.
The 1911 American Tobacco and Standard Oil decisions are important not
merely because of the importance of the particular industrial combinations
involved but because the suits were initiated as a challenge to the most signifi-
cant combination movement this country has ever experienced. Between 1898
and 1904 the great merger movement had transformed the structure of Ameri-
55. The Government's description of Standard Oils allegedly unlawful practices
covered fifty-seven pages of the printed record. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 42 (1911).
56. Id. at 76.
57. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
58. Id. at 181. (Emphasis added.)
59. Id. at 182.
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can industry. It had changed markets of many sellers into markets of few
sellers and markets of few sellers into markets of fewer sellers. It had created
few if any outright monopolies, but the changes it had wrought in the pattern
of industry undoubtedly had affected market behavior.
Although the Supreme Court found that the Standard Oil and American
Tobacco Companies had violated the Sherman Act and ordered their dissolu-
tion, the decisions reflected a judicial attitude friendly to industrial consolida-
tion and a complacency towards market power not evidenced by the Congress
that enacted the statute. The Court's enunciation of the rule of reason and
its emphasis on intent and conduct laid the basis for a series of decisions that
left undisturbed some of the greatest of the industrial combines. 0 It is scarcely
an exaggeration to say that it validated the new industrial structure.
The 1920 Steel case 01 illustrates this generalization. Here was a suit to
dissolve the greatest combination that had come out of the country's greatest
combination movement. The United States Steel Corporation, American's
first billion dollar concern, was a combination of combinations into the making
of which some 180 independent firms had gone. But the Supreme Court in the
Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases had by its rule of reason put such
combinations beyond the reach of section 1 of the Sherman Act unless they
had a long history of predatory practices showing a continuing intent to sup-
press competition. That left section 2, of course, as an instrument for striking
down combinations that had monopolized their markets. But unfortunately
monopoly is a no more precise term than restraint of trade, By the time
the Steel case reached the courts the corporation's percentage of steel ingot
output had shrunk from its original two-thirds to about one-half, and its
relative share of the output of finished steel products had similarly lessened. "
The Supreme Court found the corporation large, but it concluded that the act
did not condemn mere size. The corporation in the Court's judgment lacked
monopoly power and had not abused such power as it may have had.03
60. United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578 (D. Mass. 1912), aff'd, 227 U.S. 202
(1913) (United Shoe Machinery Co.) ; United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859
(D. Md. 1916) ; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) ; United
States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
61. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
62. U.S. BUREAU OF COR.PORATIONS, REPORT ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY, pt. 1, 56 (1911).
63. Students of antitrust have commonly concluded from a study of the American
Tobacco and Standard Oil cases and the 1920 Steel case that the Supreme Court distin-
guished between the existence of monopoly power and its abuse. The Attorney General's
Committee on the antitrust laws rejected this conclusion. In its brief analysis of the Steel
case it found: "Technically . . .the decision does not. depend upon the so-called 'abuse'
theory of Section 2." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEZ TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 50-51 (1955). But the dissenters in the Steel case, fresh
from their contact and discussions with the majority, thought differently. Justice Day
said: "That the exercise of the power may be withheld, or exerted with forbearing benevo-
lence, does not place such combinations beyond the authority of the statute which was
intended to prohibit their formation. . . ." United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251
U.S. 417, 464 (1920). Did the dissenters misconstrue the majority opinion? If in rejecting
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The extent to which this interpretation emasculated the Sherman Act as an
instrument for preserving a competitive industrial structure in the American
economy is, I believe, not generally understood. As previously indicated, the
Great Combination Movement had created few if any complete monopolies,
but it had changed greatly the pattern of industry by reducing the number of
sellers in many national markets. In so doing it created the modern problem
of oligopoly, where structure may influence conduct and conduct may influence
performance. But unless their conduct is predatory, combinations falling
short of monopoly under the rule of reason as originally enunciated are beyond
the statute's reach."
The majority of the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee apparently
failed to see this significance in the Court's decision in the Steel case, or having
seen it were silent. The Supreme Court dissenters in the case were more dis-
cerning. Unequipped with the modem tools of economic analysis and un-
familiar with professional jargon, the minority of the Court made a direct and
uncomplicated, though certainly over-simplified, finding that the Steel Cor-
poration, "fortified and equipped," as it was, "could if it saw fit dominate
the trade and control competition. . . ."6 Some members of the Attorney
General's Committee were equally discerning. They pointed out, as the dis-
senting opinion had done, that "it was erroneous in a case dealing with a
combination or conspiracy which suppressed free competition, to require
'complete monopolization.' "G I believe they are correct.
Later Decisions Disturb Business Leaders
But it is not against applications of the rule of reason that the contemporary
advocates of change have complained. Clearly big business would have much
to gain by a return to the rule of reason as applied in the cases heretofure con-
sidered. Certain later decisions disturb them. They allege that big business
as such is now under attack. The implications of the 1945 and 1950 decisions
in the Aluminum case,67 and the minority opinion in the Columbia Steel
case,68 are their chief source of worry.
In the 1945.Ahninum opinion the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
sitting as a court of final review, was concerned primarily with the meaning
the nonexercise of market power as an answer to § 2 charges they were only knocking
down a straw man they had set up, Judge Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), was doing the same thing twenty-five years later.
64. The Supreme Court's decision in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781 (1946), of course condemned conspiracy among oligopolists and recognized that
circumstantial evidence might be adequate to convict; but this was a criminal case and
left the structure of the industry undisturbed.
65. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 464 (1920).
66. REPORT OF THE ArroRNEn Gmm!'s NATIONAL Comnarrmn TO STUDY THlE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 51 (1955).
67. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), new
petitions considered, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
68. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534 (1948).
1955] 1125
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
and application of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The specific questions it
posed were: (1) Did the Aluminum Company of America have a monopoly
of the manufacture and sale of aluminum ingots? (2) If it did, had it
violated the Sherman Act in obtaining it? In answering the first question
Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court, adopted an economic criterion.
He found that for the five years 1934-1938 inclusive Alcoa had supplied over
ninety per cent of the virgin aluminum bought by domestic consumers in ingots
or fabricated products, and he ruled that this percentage "is enough to con-
stitute a monopoly. '69 In rejecting the lower court's finding that between
1929 and 1938 Alcoa had controlled only thirty-three per cent of the domestic
market-which the lower court had delineated as including secondary alumi-
num 70 but not Alcoa's fabricated products-Judge Hand acknowledged that
control of so small a percentage certainly did not constitute monopoly; and
he said that control of sixty-four per cent (the proportion of Alcoa's total pro-
duction, including the aluminum it fabricated, to total secondary and imported
virgin aluminum) was "doubtful. '71
Having determined that Alcoa had a monopoly of the domestic market in
aluminum ingots, the court turned to the second question: Had Alcoa violated
the Sherman Act in achieving monopoly? To establish this, the court stated,
it is unnecessary to show bad conduct or specific intent. A monopolist is not
a sleepwalker ;72 it knows where it is going. In so reasoning the court discarded
intent as a test of illegality where monopoly power has been achieved 73 and
held that Alcoa's having acquired monopoly was enough to condemn it, unless
perhaps monopoly has been thrust upon it. Thus the court recognized that
not all monopolies fall within the meaning of the statute. Apparently if the
optimum size of a firm precludes competition, a firm that becomes a monopoly
in the quest for efficiency does not violate the law. 74 But for a firm to main-
69. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1945).
70. Economists have criticized Judge Hand's exclusion of secondary aluminum as a
component of the market Alcoa faced in selling ingots, contending that it is doubtful that
Alcoa's production policies actually took account of the fact that eventually, five to twenty-
five years later, some ingot aluminum came on the market again as secondary aluminum
and competed for certain uses.
71. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
72. See Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U.
Cm. L. REv. 567, 579-80 (1947).
73. Specific intent-"an intent which goes beyond the mere intent to do the act"-the
court explained, is an essential element in establishing the crime of attempting to monopo-
lize; but where, as in Alcoa's case, the possession of monopoly power has been established,
it is enough that Alcoa "meant to keep, and did keep, that complete and exclusive hold
upon the ingot market with which it started. That was to 'monopolize' that market, how-
ever innocently it otherwise proceeded." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
74. Judge Wyzanski illuminated this principle in deciding the Shoe Machinery case,
saying:
"[T]he defendant may escape statutory liability if it bears the burden of proving
that it owes its monopoly solely to superior skill, superior products, natural advan-
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tain a monopoly deliberately, seizing every opportunity for growth by fore-
casting demand and expanding to provide for it and in this way precluding
the entry of rivals, is to monopolize in violation of the law. The court found
that Alcoa had so monopolized. In reaching this conclusion the court rejected
the distinction made by earlier courts between possessing power and using or
abusing it. The court reasoned that every transaction by a monopolist in-
volves the exercise of power. As the court put it, "The power and its exercise
must needs coalesce."5 It is against power over the market that the statute is
directed, the power to exclude rivals and the power to control prices.
Businessmen and some students of antitrust see in these doctrines a threat
to bigness. Certain pronouncements in the 1950 decision of the district court
in the same case have added to their anxiety. Although the district court
tempered somewhat the appellate court's condemnation of monopoly main-
tained through foresight, 70 it retained jurisdiction over the case for five years
and warned Alcoa that "if, for any reason, it should appear that [the competi-
tion of Reynolds Metals Company and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Cor-
poration] . .. is feeble, uncertain and ineffective," the court would take addi-
tional appropriate action.77 Whether this was an invitation to Alcoa to hold
an umbrella over its weaker rivals or merely an admonition to check its
own growth deliberately by refusing to utilize such competitive advantages as
it might have, business leaders have interpreted the court's warning as a
threat to bigness as such.
They see in the minority opinion of Justice Douglas in the Columbia Steel
case 78 an even more certain manifestation of hostility. United States Steel
Corporation's acquisition of Consolidated Steel Corporation, said the minority,
"gives it unquestioned domination [of the Pacific Coast steel industry)
... and protects it against growth of the independents in that developing
region. That alone is sufficient to condemn the purchase. Its serious
impact on competition and the economy is emphasized when it is recalled
that United States Steel has one-third of the rolled steel production of
the entire country. The least I can say is that a company that has that
tremendous leverage on our economy is big enough."
79
tages (including accessibility to raw materials or markets), economic or technological
efficiency (including scientific research), low margins of profit maintained perma-
nently and without discrimination, or licenses conferred by, and used within, the
limits of law (including patents on one's own inventions, or franchises granted
directly to the enterprise by a public authority).'
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953).
75. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
76. The district court took as a guide the Supreme Court's pronouncement in United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 526 (1948), that "no direction has appeared
of a public policy that forbids, per se, an expansion of facilities of an existing company to
meet the needs of new markets of a community, whether that community is nation-wide
or county-wide." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 346 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950).
77. Id.at 418.
78. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534 (1948).
79. Id. at 540.
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Such decisions represent to business leaders and their spokesmen a drift
towards a condemnation of size per se.80
From such hostility big business understandably seeks security in a return
to the old rule of reason. But some advocates of change have expounded the
rule quite differently from the exposition hereinbefore given, and they have
coupled with it the principle of workable competition. What they seem to
want is a rule of reason that will place an obligation on the courts to consider
all relevant economic facts and in the light of them to reach a judgment on
the question, is the arrangement complained of consistent with the principle of
workable or effective competition ?s That, as I understand it, is pretty close
to what the Sherman Act, unamended and uncorrupted by doubtful and con-
fusing judicial interpretations, aimed at. Unfamiliar with a professional jargon
not yet created, and undisciplined in the intricacies of economic theory, Con-
gress apparently sought to outlaw those arrangements that hindered competi-
tion-the unimpeded operation of market forces-and to encourage those
that promoted it.
Such an interpretation of the rule of reason would purge it of the element
of value judgment on the overall reasonableness of a restriction on competi-
tion, and would simply condemn all market arrangements that tend to make
competition less effective or workable. This standard has not yet been applied;
if it had been, the results in some major cases might have been different. This
study will examine three industries in which the Department of Justice has
at one time or another charged a dominant firm with having violated the
Sherman Act-steel, cellophane and tin cans-and will try to answer the
80. Thomas E. Sunderland, general counsel, Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, voiced a
typical reaction in a speech at the University of Chicago, Feb. 7, 1951 :
"Underlying these trends in the law seems to be a deep-seated suspicion of big
business, a suspicion which has been taken advantage of by those who want to re-
design the business and industrial setup in this country. For them, and the poli-
tician as well, the attack on big business is as safe politically as a crusade against
sin. As a consequence, it has not always been necessary to be entirely objective."
Sunderland, Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field, 3 SYRlACtSn L. REV. 60, 76
(1951).
81. In its 1952 report on Effective Competition, the Secretary of Commerce's Business
Advisory Council declared that "to install a modernized Rule of Reason it is also necessary
to find an acceptable standard for judging competition." It offered as such a standard
"effective competition," under which "there should be unhampered business incentives and
freedom of choice, with reasonable alternatives for buyers and sellers." U.S. D'"T oF
COM ,ERcE, EFFECrIVE COMPETITION, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY oF COMMERCE B H Is
BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL 8 (1952) (italics omitted). Oppenheim, Federal A,:ltrusl
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Micn. L, REV. 1139,
1145 (1952), ties the concept of workable competition to the rule of reason more tightly:
"[T]he Rule of Reason would provide the central artery of a procedural device for con-
sidering all relevant legal and economic factors in any given factual situation. Thereby
the concept of Workable Competition can be given ... substance ...." And he recommends
a "congressional declaration of national antitrust policy" which will "expressly state that
the competition which the antitrust laws seek to foster and maintain is Workable Com-
petition." Id. at 1144.
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question how each industry would have fared if tested in terms of a rule of
reason embodying the standard of workable competition.
THE STEEL COMBINATION
Structure
The merger movement in the steel industry, which culminated in the organi-
zation of the United States Steel Corporation, transformed a market of many
sellers into a market of a few sellers. As previously indicated, the Steel
Corporation controlled about two-thirds of the country's production of crude
steel and from one-half to four-fifths of the principal rolled steel products. In
the intervening years, although it has increased its assets enormously, it has
grown less rapidly than its major rivals. Yet today it accounts for approxi-
mately one-third of the country's steel ingot capacity. It is more than twice
as large as its nearest rival, together with which it accounts for almost half the
country's ingot output. With eight rivals it accounts for about four-fifths.8 -'
The steel industry's structure is oligopolistic, and it is likely to remain that
way. Entrance is so difficult that no fully integrated steel company has de-
veloped to challenge the position of the leading producers except by merger.8m
Two obstacles block entry. First, steel production is a large-scale enterprise.8 4
Benjamin Fairless while chairman of United States Steel Corporation's board
testified before the Senate Committee on Currency and Banking on March
21, 1955, that to build a steel plant from the ground up would cost $300 per
ton of crude steel capacity.8 5 Thus a medium-sized plant of 1,000,000-ton
capacity would cost $300,000,000. Second, new ventures with the attendant
risks offer little inducement to top managerial talent. Why should well-paid
steel executives managing but not owning successful corporations surrender
reasonable security in a going concern to accept managerial responsibility
without ownership in new enterprises whose future is uncertain?
The large optimum size of a steel company influences its costs. Fixed costs
82. Calculated from reported capacities of United States Steel Corp. and of Bethlehem,
Republic, Jones & Laughlin, National, Youngstownii, Armco, Inland, and Wheeling Steel
Cos., MOODY's INDUSTRIALS pasSim (1954), and from total United States capacity as re-
ported by the American Iron and Steel Institute, 127 Steel Facts, Aug. 1954 Supp., p. 4.
83. National Steel Corporation is the most recent challenger of the majors. It was
created in 1929 by merging three independent firms, including an iron ore producer.
MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS 3091-92 (1930). At the outset it ranked eighth among the largest
steel companies; by 1935 it ranked fifth.
84. Charles F. Ramseyer, consulting engineer to the steel industry, testified before
the Celler Committee that to provide the necessary facilities to convert iron ore into
finished steel on an economical scale required an investment at 1948 prices of about
$250,000,000. Hearings Before Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of /fe House
Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, pt. 4A, at 417 (1950). Ernest
T. Weir, chairman of the National Steel Corporation's board of directors, testified that
to duplicate the facilities of National-the nation's fifth largest producer but also the fifth
smallest of the big nine-would cost $1,100,000,00D. Id. at 817.
85. Wall Street Journal, March 22, 1955, p. 2, col. 3.
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-that is, costs the aggregate of which do not change with changes in output-
constitute a large part of total costs. Average variable costs, the aggregate of
which changes with changes in output, tend to remain constant over a wide
range of output. Many of the costs encountered in making finished steel
products are joint. It is difficult to allocate accurately a proper proportion
of total cost to any specific product. And finally, continuous operation of a
steel plant is necessary to keep average costs down. It is expensive to stop
and start blast furnaces, coke ovens, and steel furnaces.80
Steelmakers believe that the demand for steel is price-inelastic; at any
particular time a change in price of any given percentage will bring a
smaller change in purchases. Moreover, demand is cyclical. The demand for
steel is a derived demand, stemming from the demand for things made wholly
or in part from steel-buildings, roads, bridges, automobiles, refrigerators,
stoves and the like. Steel products are durable, and in a business recession
demand for them falls off sharply. Much unused steel capacity results. In the
forty years before World War I the production of steel ingots declined in
periods of business recession by more than twenty per cent six times, by more
than thirty per cent four times, and by more than fifty per cent twice. At the
depth of the 1929-1933 depression steel companies produced less than one-
fourth the tonnage of steel ingots they had produced in 1929.87
Finally, steel is a homogeneous product. Steel bought from stock is stand-
ardized. Special steels are bought on specifications with which any producer
can comply. One man's steel is as good as another's.
Conduct
The conduct of the industry stems from and reflects its structure. The
nature of cost and the nature of demand paradoxically both stimulate and
inhibit competition. Because a large part of his aggregate costs are fixed, a
producer's temptation to cut prices with a decline in aggregate demand is
great, and the difficulty of allocating costs precisely aggravates the tempta-
tion. With demand inelastic, price cuts may increase total industry sales but
little. They will, however, shift business from one supplier to another. If one
producer cuts, all must sooner or later meet the lower price or lose business.
Believing that a price cut may result in approximately the same volume and
distribution of business, producers are reluctant to cut. Self-restraint tends
to prevent price cutting. But it is generally not enough. To avoid it, steel
producers have resorted to three practices: they have followed the price leader-
ship of the Steel Corporation;88 they have sold steel under a basing point
86. For a more complete discussion of the economic characteristics of the iron and
steel industry see STOCKING, BASING POINT PRICING AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT c. 2
(1954).
87. Id. at 27.
88. In 1.936 the president of United States Steel testified, "I would say we generally
make the prices." Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce of; S.
4055, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 595 (1936). Eugene Grace when president of Bethlehem Steel
1130 [Vol. 64 :1107
THE RULE OF REASON
pricing system;59 and they have collectively determined the average cost of
producing extras and used this as a basis in pricing them.0
The combination that in 1901 reduced the number of steel sellers and made
the Steel Corporation the dominant producer facilitated these practices. The
Steel Corporation from the outset busied itself with the problem of stabilizing
prices. This was both Judge Elbert H. Gary's policy and his practice. As
chairman of the board of the Steel Corporation he testified at a congressional
hearing in 1911 that he believed competition in the steel industry inevitably
tended to be ruinous and that cooperation-under government supervision if
necessary-should replace competition.9' Participation by the corporation's
subsidiaries in various pooling arrangements during its early history, the Gary
dinners, and "Pittsburgh Plus" implemented the corporation's stabilization
policy. Despite Clark's contention that in an industry with the characteristics
of steel, basing point pricing tends to develop spontaneously, 2 the record
indicates that the industry deliberately adopted it as a device to insure identical
delivered prices by rival sellers. 3 Coupled with the industry's acceptance
of the Steel Corporation's price leadership and its use of common freight rate
testified before the Temporary National Economic Committee in 1939 that he could not
recall Bethlehem's ever having initiated a price decrease and that his company "would
normally await the schedules as published by the Steel Corporation." "As a general prac-
tice," he said, the "pace is set ... by the Steel Corporation." TNEC, I.vsr,,Tzo:: OF
CONCENTRATION OF EcoNomic Powza, Hcarings, pt. 19, at 10601-02 (1939).
89. On July 21, 1924, the Federal Trade Commission ordered the United States Steel
Corp. to cease selling steel under the "Pittsburgh Plus" system of pricing. United States
Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924). On October 5, 1948, the Third Circuit entered a consent
decree affirming the Commission's 1924 order. United States Steel Corp. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 4 STATUTES AND DEcIsIoNs, F.T.C. 789 (1948). On August 10, 1951, the
Federal Trade Commission again ordered respondents representing over 85% of total
domestic steel production to cease quoting prices calculated according to any system or
formula which produces identical price quotations. American Iron and Steel Institute, 48
F.T.C. 123 (1951).
90. The Federal Trade Commission persistently forbade the uniform pricing of e.\tras
in each of the proceedings described in note 89 supra.
91. Hearings Before the House Committee on Investigation of the United Stales Steel
Corporation, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess. 61 297 (1911).
92. Clark, Basing Poin- Methods of Price Quoting, 4 CAxADrAN J. Eco. PoL Sc.
477 (1938).
93. As usual, Judge Gary, the Steel Corporation's first president and later chairman
of its board, was quite candid in describing the purpose of basing point pricing: "It was
deemed necessary for the orderly conduct of the business to have one basing price, and that
was not alone for the benefit of the producer, but for the benefit of the purchaser ... so
that every user of steel all over the country bought and used his steel on a certain basis,
knowing in advance that everyone else who bought steel had to pay e-xactly as he did, with
the addition of the increased freight depending upon where he wanted to use the steel"
Brief for states of Illinois, Iowa, 'Minnesota and Wisconsin as Amici Curiae, p. 8M4, United
States Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924). H. P. Bope, who was with Carnegie Steel Company
from 1879 to 1918, testified: "I should say that the Pittsburgh Plus system was a man-made
proposition necessitated by chaotic conditions in the steel market, which seemed to render
it the only available means of stabilizing the industry." Id. at 876.
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books, basing point pricing provided a means of fortifying the natural reluct-
ance of oligopolists to engage in competitive pricing.
The industry's practice in pricing extras contributed to the same end.
Under the basing point system of pricing, the published base prices covered
products of specified standards. Buyers frequently wanted steel of different
specifications. Differences in quality, dimensions, weight, finish, chemical con-
tent, known to the trade as "extras," all called for different prices. The possible
combinations of extras varied, and costs were myriad. Without some com-
mon guide for determining their price, competitive pricing was inevitable.
The industry's method of solving this problem changed from time to time.
For a decade after the Steel Corporation's organization, steel companies ap-
parently collaborated in making and distributing price lists.04 More recently
technical committees of the American Iron and Steel Institute made cost
studies for determining the average cost of making extras.05 The Steel Cor-
poration used these as a basis for pricing extras, and other companies followed
suit.
These practices-uniform pricing of extras and basing point pricing-reflect
the Steel Corporation's continuing live-and-let-live policy which in 1920 ap-
parently won Supreme Court approval. 90
Performance
Have the Steel Corporation's and the industry's performances been compat-
ible with the principle of workable competition? What has been the course
of steel prices? Has the Steel Corporation been an efficient producer of steel?
Has it contributed to technical and industrial progress? Has it discovered new
and better ways of producing steel and put them into use? Has it discovered
94. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 440 (1920).
95. Benjamin Fairless when president of the Steel Corporation testified: "[S]ince our
motive is only to charge cost for services rendered, then obviously it is our duty to develop
the best cost that exists, not only within our own company but within this industry." TNEC,
INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC PoWE , Hearings, pt. 19, at 10560 (1939).
The Department of Justice after examining the extras books of twenty-five steel companies
found that each quoted identical prices for all extras covering sixteen major steel products.
Id. at 10724-25. In its 1951 cease and desist order against the American Iron and Steel
Institute and ninety steel companies the Federal Trade Commission forbade "any planned
common course of action" to fix prices or any element thereof or to collect, compile, or
exchange price lists or extra charges or deductions, or to use such lists as a factor in com-
puting price quotations. American Iron and Steel Institute, 48 F.T.C. 123, 152 (1951).
96. The policy, not the practices, was approved. Said the Court, "The Corporation
was formed in 1901, no act of aggression upon its competitors is charged against it. . ."
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920). Again, "[C]om-
petitors, dealers and customers of the Corporation testify in multitude that no adventi-
tious interference was employed to either fix or maintain prices and that they were constant
or varied according to natural conditions.... [W]e may ... wonder that the despotism of
the Corporation, so baneful to the world in the representation of the Government, did not
produce protesting victims." Id. at 449. Inasmuch as business rivals profited from these
practices mutually indulged in, the wonder is after all not so great.
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new and better steel products and offered then to the public on increasingly
attractive terms?
The corporation's efforts to stabilize prices did not always succeed. At times
when demand was slack, basing point pricing weakened. At other times steel-
makers sold below their quoted prices and discriminated among buyers. The
Great Depression weakened steel prices as it did other prices. But the movement
of steel prices brings into clear focus the influence of structure on price behavior.
Between 1926 and their depression low points (1931-1934) the price indexes
of steel products whose production was least concentrated showed the largest
decline. Concentration was greatest in the production of steel rails, shapes,
plates, bars and tin plate; it was least in the production of wire nails, hot and
cold rolled strip, and hot and cold rolled sheets. With the Steel Corporation and
three other companies accounting for 100 per cent of the domestic production
of steel rails, their average annual base price declined only 15.4 per cent from
1926 to their depression low. With the corporation and four other companies
accounting for 90.5 per cent of total capacity for making steel shapes, their
average annual price declined 19.4 per cent. With the corporation and four
other companies accounting for 73.3 per cent of domestic capacity for making
steel plates (and ten companies accounting for 91 per cent), the average annual
price declined 16.5 per cent. With the corporation and four other companies
accounting for about 80 per cent of tin plate capacity, tin plate prices declined
only 19.5 per cent. With the corporation and four other companies accounting
for 73 per cent of domestic capacity for making steel bars, their price declined
only 21.5 per cent.97 During approximately the same period wholesale prices
of all manufactured commodities declined by almost 30 per cent.08
In contrast to the relatively stable prices of steel rails, plates, shapes, bars,
and tin plate, the prices of wire nails, hot and cold rolled strip, and hot and
cold rolled sheets were very flexible indeed. With five leading companies ac-
counting for only 68.2 per cent of nailmaking capacity, prices declined by 29
per cent; with five leading producers accounting for 65.7 per cent of hot
rolled strip capacity, prices declined 37.9 per cent. With five leading com-
panies accounting for only 64.6 per cent of the hot rolled sheet capacity,
prices declined 31.6 per cent; with the five leading companies accounting for
only 43 per cent of the cold rolled strip capacity, prices declined 45.2 per cent;
and with the five leading companies accounting for 61.1 per cent of the cold
rolled sheet capacity, prices declined 42.3 per cent.0 9
97. For data on concentration of production see AuERicAN IRON AND STEMr INSTITUTE,
DIRxroRY OF IRON AND STEEL WoRKs OF THE UNrrE STATES AND CANADA (23d ed. 193) ;
TNEC, INVESTIGATION OF THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMiC PowER, Hearings, pt. 18,
Appendix, Exhibit No. 1349, Table XVII, at 10409. For data on price movements, see
UNITED STATES STEEL CoRP., TNEC PAPERs, vol. II, at 76 (1940); Iron Age, Jan. 4,
1940, p. 172.
98. Index of Manufactured Products (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data), repro-
duced in REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE Ecoxo!tc REPORT, DECmnEra 1949
STEEL PRICE IxCREASES, REP. No. 1373, S1st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1950).
99. See note 97 supra.
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While quoted prices do not always reflect realized prices, a more recent
study by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 100 reveals both the
relative stability of quoted prices of eight major steel products (despite major
fluctuations in output) and only minor departures of actual delivered prices
from quoted prices. For example, with steel ingot production only 51 per cent
of capacity in the second quarter of 1939, realized prices for steel plates were
97 per cent of quoted prices. With steel ingot production at 98 per cent of
capacity in the second quarter of 1941, actual prices for steel plates were 100
per cent of quoted prices. Quoted prices for steel plates remained unchanged
despite an almost 100 per cent increase in steel ingot output. The variations
in quoted prices between these two periods and the departures from quoted
prices were somewhat greater for hot and cold rolled sheets and hot and cold
rolled strip, but about the same for merchant bars and structural shapes.101
In all instances the course of prices was impressive evidence of the effective-
ness of the industry's price stabilization policy.
Apparently the corporation's preoccupation with stabilizing prices was
bought at a high cost, both to consumers and to the corporation itself. In the
period for which data are available, steel prices were not only relatively stable,
they were relatively high. High costs made them high. The steel industry's
practices described under Conduct, above, increased the average cost of ship-
ping steel by increasing the average distance shipped and by discouraging the
use of low-cost production and transportation facilities; they increased the
cost of selling steel by substituting sales effort for price competition; and they
increased the average cost of producing steel by encouraging inefficiency and
protecting high-cost producers. The first two points should be fairly obvious. 102
The third requires brief comment.
The Steel Corporation while concerning itself with stabilizing prices ne-
glected the problem of efficiency. Apparently it was more concerned with
selling steel at high prices than with making it at low cost. In its effort to
100. The Bureau's study, made in 1943, is not available in published form, but its find-
ings were reproduced in a trade journal article, "Labor Department Examines Consumers'
Prices of Steel Products," Iron Age, April 25, 1946, pp. 118-145H. Data on production
in percentages of capacity for certain quarters of the years 1939 and 1941 appear in Iron
Age, Jan. 7, 1943, p. 204.
101. These findings are based on data compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, reproduced in Iron Age, April 25, 1946, p. 118.
102. Basing point pricing results in persistent crosshauling and encourages the use of
rail transportation even when cheaper water or truck transportation is available, The
Ford, Bacon & Davis 1935-1.938 survey of the Steel Corporation's operations, described in
the next paragraph of the text, reportedly found that the corporation's practice of supplying
Texas and its southwestern and even its Pacific Coast markets from its northern and east-
ern plants, instead of from its low-cost Birmingham facilities, was costing the corporation
$1,000,000 annually. The literature on the economics of basing point pricing is voluminous,
including MAcJmup, TuE BASING-POINT SYSTEM (1949); Clark, supra -note 92; Kaysen,
Basing Point Pricing and Public Policy, 63 Q.J. EcoN. 289 (1949); Mund, The "Freight
Allowed" Method of Price Quotation, 54 Q. J. EcoN. 232 (1940) ; Stigler, A Theory of
Delivered Price Systems, 39 Aai. ECON. REv. 1143 (1949).
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keep the whole industry orderly it failed to keep its own house in order. The
corporation has itself presented the supporting evidence for these generaliza-
tions. After Judge Gary's death in the late 1920's a new management, troubled
by the corporation's loss of relative position in the industry, subjected it
to a severe and penetrating self-analysis. When its own engineers concluded
that its operation was shot through with waste and inefficiency and pro-
posed radical measures to overcome these deficiencies, the corporation em-
ployed a firm of industrial engineers to investigate its organization and opera-
tions in order to disprove or corroborate its own engineer's findings. In a 240-
volume report the outsiders confirmed the findings of the insiders. Myron
Taylor, retiring chairman of the corporation's board of directors, on his own
initiative told the story in a series of articles in Iron Age in 1938;203 and in
1950 Benjamin Fairless while president of the corporation somewhat reluct-
antly brought out the details under a relentless examination by the chief
counsel of the Celler Committee. 104 The report as revealed by Fairless indi-
cated that the Steel Corporation was a big, sprawling, inert giant, whose
production operations were improperly coordinated; suffering from the lack
of a long-run planning agency; relying on an antiquated system of cost
accounting; with an inadequate knowledge of the cost or the relative profit-
ability of the many thousands of items it sold; with production and cost
standards generally below those considered everyday practice in other in-
dustries; with inadequate knowledge of its domestic markets and no clear
appreciation of its opportunities in foreign markets; with less efficient pro-
duction facilities than those of its rivals; and slow in introducing new processes
and new products. Specifically, the report revealed that the corporation was
slow in introducing the continuous rolling mill; slow in getting into the pro-
duction of cold rolled steel products; slow in recognizing the potentialities of
the wire business; slow to adopt the heat-treating process for the production
of steel sheets; slow in getting into stainless steel products; slow in producing
cold rolled sheets; slow in tin plate development; slow in utilizing waste gases;
slow in utilizing low-cost water transportation because of its consideration for
the railroads; in short, slow to grasp the remarkable business opportunities that
a dynamic America offered it. The corporation was pictured as a follower, not
a leader, in industrial efficiency.
Conclusions
This brief analysis of the steel industry's structure and conduct and of the
Steel Corporation's performance warrants the conclusion that under the cor-
poration's lead the industry did not conform to the standard of workable
103. Taylor, Ten Years of Steel, Iron Age, April 7, 1938, pp. 70-A-71; April 14, 1938,
pp. 50-53, 92-94; April 28, 1938, pp. 36-38; 'May 5, 1938, pp. 47, 73-75. The "outsiders"'
report is the Ford, Bacon & Davis report referred to in note 102 su pra.
104. Hearings Before the Subcomnittee on Study of Monopaily Power of thw House
Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, pt. 4A, at 465-673 passin, espe-
cially 627 (1950).
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competition. Its structure contributed to conduct incompatible with an effec-
tive interplay of market forces, and its structure and conduct resulted in unac-
ceptable performance. 105 It seems not unlikely that in an antitrust proceeding
based on the rule of reason and the principle of workable competition as
herein expounded, the corporation would have fared badly. 100
THE CELLOPHANE INDUSTRY
An analysis of the district court's opinion in the Cellophane case 107 suggests
that those who agitate to incorporate the principle of workable competition
into the antitrust laws so that existing oligopolistic structures may be pre-
served have won their campaign without a battle. It also suggests that the
principle may be a treacherous guide to courts not schooled in the intricacies
of economic analysis. In formulating his opinion Judge Leahy stated that
the case raised two questions: "(1) Does du Pont possess monopoly power
in making and selling cellophane? (2) If so, has it been guilty of monopolizing
within the meaning of the Sherman Act as interpreted in the Aluminum
case?"108 The court reasoned that if it answered "no" to the first question,
it need not consider the second. It was quite positive in its conclusion, for it
stated: "Facts, in large part uncontested, demonstrate duPont cellophane is
sold under such intense competitive conditions acquisition of market control
105. More detailed studies have led to similar conclusions. See MARENGO, BASING
POINT PRICING IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Uni-
versity, June 1950) ; STOCKING, BASING POINT PRICING AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT c. 6
(1954).
106. It should be noted that the Steel Corporation of the 1930's is not the Steel Cor-
poration of today. According to Fairless' testimony before the Celler Committee, Hearints
Before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Commitee on the
Judiciary, supra note 104, the corporation adopted such of the engineers' suggestions as it
felt warranted. The corporation has reorganized, modernized, and expanded its facilities
and operations at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars, and Fairless' modest contention
that the corporation is today as efficient as any of its rivals, id. at 631, seems reasonable.
But that the industry's structure still impedes competitive price adjustments with changes
in demand is indicated by recent price movements. Between July 1953 and July 1954, when
production of ingots and steel for castings declined from 93.1% of capacity to 68.1%, the
price of cold rolled and hot rolled strip, cold rolled and hot rolled sheets, and steel plates
remained unchanged. Iron Age, Jan. 6, 1955, p. 340. In July 1954, when production
dropped to 62.9% of capacity, United States Steel raised steel prices. The Steel Corpora-
tion's explanation of this anomaly was an increase in labor costs. Wall Street Journal,
July 2, 1954, p. 1, col. 2. Other companies followed the lead. Iron Age, July 8, 1954, pp.
146-48; July 15, 1954, pp. 106-68.
107. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
The discussion that follows in the text is based on the record in this case. Government
exhibits contained in the record will be designated GX and defendant's exhibits DX. The
title of the case will be repeated only for references to the opinion. For a more compre-
hensive analysis of the economic issues involved in the case, see Stocking & Mueller, The
Cellophane Case and the New Competition, 45 Am. EcoN. REV. 29 (1955).
108. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 54 (D. Del.
1953).
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or monopoly power is a practical impossibility."' 09 This study challenges the
validity of the court's conclusion that du Pont had no monopoly in selling
cellophane, though it leaves to the Supreme Court the question whether such
monopoly power as du Pont may have had violates the statute.110 In challeng-
ing the district court's conclusions the analysis will consider du Pont's strategy
(conduct) in protecting cellophane from the competition of rival products;
analyze the structure of the cellophane industry and its market; and evaluate
du Pont's performance in making and selling cellophane.
Conduct
In 1923 du Pont entered into contracts with the world's sole producer of
cellophane, Comptoir des Textiles Artificiels, a French corporation, which
granted to a jointly owned company, Du Pont Cellophane Company, Inc., the
exclusive right to the Comptoir's patents and know-how in making and selling
cellophane in the North and Central American market.'' Du Pont at this
time recognized that the patents might not guarantee it complete protection
from rival producers but considered that the patents together with the trade
skills and technical knowledge accompanying them justified an investment
of some $2,000,000, on which it anticipated annual earnings of over $600,000,
or earnings at an annual rate on investment of over thirty-one per cent. 12
Believing that it had a highly differentiated if not a unique flexible wrapping
material for which a large and expanding market could be readily developed,
it sought to protect itself from the competition of other producers of cello-
phane. To do this it proceeded on both domestic and foreign fronts. To curb
imports of cellophane it both sought a tariff increase 113 and made agreements
with foreign producers providing for a division of markets. While it did not
succeed immediately in getting a direct tariff increase, it obtained a reclassi-
fication of cellophane which on February 24, 1929, raised the duty from
twenty-five to sixty per cent ad valorem. The higher duty soon reduced
annual foreign sales in the American market from more than twenty per cent
of the total domestic business to less than nine per cent.114 The Tariff Act of
109. Id. at 197-98.
110. On October 14, 1954, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 348 U.S. S06 (1954).
111. Option contract of Jan. 6, 1923, GX 1458, pp. 5999-6008; organizational agree-
ment of June 9, 1923, GX 1001, pp. 989-997; license agreement of Dec. 26, 1923, GX
1002, pp. 998-1001.
112. Report of Dr. Fin Sparre, head of du Pont's development department, April 14,
1923, GX 392, p. 5451.
113. About du Pont's effort to get higher duties on cellophane L A. Yerkes, president
of Du Porit Cellophane Co., Inc., wrote W. C. Spruance, du Punt vice president, on July
25, 1925: "In order that you shall be entirely familiar with the Cellophane status, I want
to let you know that we are endeavoring to have the duty on Cellophane raised from 25%
to 45%, and Curie, Lane and Wallace are of the opinion that we have a fair chance of
getting this through." GX 1068, p. 1142.
114. Du Pont Cellophane's quarterly competitive report, first quarter 1929, reported
that importers had had 21% of domestic business in 1927 and 24% in 1928. GX 431, p. 5677.
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1930 fixed the duty on imported cellophane at forty-five per cent ad valorem
-a smaller duty than the reclassification had brought but still enough to keep
foreign cellophane out of the United States market. From 1930 to 1947
annual cellophane imports accounted for less than one per cent of domestic
consumption. 15
On May 7, 1929, du Pont entered a patent exchange agreement with Kalle
& Company, Germany's exclusive cellophane producer under the Comptoir
patents, by which the parties agreed to exchange without charge except for
patent fees all patent rights and technological data covering cellophane, that
they then had or might later get.116 The agreement, according to C. M. Al-
bright, Du Pont Cellophane's vice president, did not "for obvious reasons"
designate the countries within which Kalle got exclusive rights, but Albright
listed them in a letter for the benefit of du Pont's Buffalo office. 111  Later
du Pont assigned Kalle exclusive patent rights on moistureproof cellophane
in the countries of Kalle's territory.118 In 1935 du Pont and British Cellophane
Limited entered into a similar patent exchange agreement which specifically
designated the areas within which each party would confine its operations.110
Meanwhile on February 12, 1930, all the world's leading cellophane producers
except du Pont had entered into a cartel agreement assigning markets and
fixing quotas. 20 Du Pont representatives attended the first day of the con-
ference as guests but did not sign the agreement. The trial court found that
they were not authorized to make any commitment and did not.121 Neverthe-
less, the agreement, which did not cover moistureproof or photographic cello-
phane, recognized the North American market as belonging to du Pont and
Sylvania Industrial Corporation of America. 22 The subsequent course of the
Its report for the fourth quarter 1.929 showed that du Pont had 91.6% of domestic business.
GX 434, p. 5714. The increased tariff and decreased imports apparently contributed to the
stability of cellophane prices. Du Pont Cellophane's competitive report, second quarter
1929, said:
"The present tariff rate (.40 per pound) as fixed by the United States Customs
Court, has increased the cost of importing Transparent Cellulose Sheeting to such
an extent that the competitors are adhering more rigidly to their published price list.
Their selling policy in the past has been to obtain preference with the manufacturer
by offering special price concessions."
GX 432, p. 5690.
115. GX 182A, p. 515A; GX 182, p. 515.
116. GX 1087, pp. 1183-86.
117. Letter of Oct. 30, 1929, GX 1091, p. 1195.
118. Du Pont Cellophane memorandum dated March 17, 1933, GX 1098, p. 1205; Letter
to Kalle dated March 20, 1933, GX 1099, p. 1206; memorandum dated April 27, 1934, re-
view of the du Pont-Kalle relations, prepared by du Pont's patent service, GX 1102, pp.
1210-12.
119. Agreement of May 3, 1935, GX 1109, pp. 1229-34.
120. "Official report," signed by producers, GX 1414, pp. 1841-44.
121. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 221 (D. Del.
1953).
122. Sylvania had come into the American market by the back door. Socit6 Indus-
trielle de la Cellulose (SIDAC) had built a cellophane plant in Belgium using the Comp-
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cartel is not clear, but apparently it broke down under the strain of the Great
Depression and World War II. In 1940 du Pont disavowed all formal terri-
torial limitations,2 3 although its agreements with Kalle and British Cellophane
were to have run for twenty years.
On the domestic front, in 1930 du Pont found itself confronted by a rival
producer, the Sylvania Industrial Corporation of America. To improve cello-
phane's usefulness as a wrapping material and to fortify it against domestic
competition, du Pont had already developed and patented a moistureproof
product. The initial moistureproof cellophane product patent, issued in 1929,
was broad in scope and comprehensive in its claims.'-' Having improved its
patent postion, du Pont notified Sylvania, which meanwhile had developed a
moistureproof cellophane of its own, that it was infringing du Pont's patents.
Eventually du Pont sued Sylvania but settled the suit by a patent exchange
and licensing agreement, under which Sylvania agreed to pay du Pont a two
per cent royalty on its net sales of moistureproof cellophane in return for the
use of du Pont's patents. For sales in excess of twenty per cent of total
domestic sales, Sylvania agreed to pay a royalty of twenty cents a pound or
thirty per cent of net sales, whichever was higher. Its penalty-free share of
toir's patented processes and secret know-how, which it had obtained from two former
employees of the Comptoir's French affiliate, La Cellophane, Sockit Anonynie. Memo-
randum of Feb. 17, 1944, on the history of du Pont cellophane, prepared in du Pont's
cellophane division, GX 1, p. 12. SIDAC at first exported to the American market and
later established Sylvania as its American subsidiary. Du Pont Cellophane Company's
quarterly competitive report, third quarter 1929, GX 433, p. 5702. Whien La Cellophane
sued SIDAC for patent infringement and in settlement took stock in SIDAC, this brought
La Cellophane indirectly through Sylvania into competition with du Pont in the American
market in violation of its 1923 contract. After prolonged negotiations for a settlement with
La Cellophane, during which du Pont pondered how to "accept reparations and at the
same time protect its future position without contravening American statutes," memoran-
dum of a Nov. 14, 1929 discussion by du Pont officials, GX 1410, p. 1831, La Cello-
phane waived the 1923 restrictions confining du Pont to the North and Central American
markets and granted it equal rights with itself in Japan and South America. Letter of
March 6,1930, from du Pont to La Cellophane, GX 1013, pp. 1027-29; excerpt from minutes
of May 8, 1930, meeting of du Pont's board of directors, GX 1015, p. 1031.
123. Identical letters dated Oct. 17, 1940, to Kalle, British Cellophane, Canadian
Industries Limited, and La Cellophane, GX 1273, p. 1602; GX 1274, p. 1603; GX 1275, p.
1604; GX 1276, p. 1605.
124. About its research program to improve cellophane, L. A. Yerkes, president of Du
Pont Cellophane, later said:
"This work was undertaken as a defensive program in connection with protecting
broadly by patents the field of moistureproofing agents other than waxes which was
the only class of material disclosed in our original Cellophane moistureproofing
patents. The investigations on this subject did, in fact, lead to the discovery of a
number of classes of materials which could serve equally well for moistureproofing
agents.... Each of these classes has been made the subject of a patent ... Altogether,
13 patent applications are being written as a result of the work done under this
project, all in view of strengthening our Moistureproof Cellophane patent situation."
December, 1933, report to Du Pont Cellophane's board of directors, Jan. 22, 1934, GX
488, p. 6478.
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the market was to be graduated upward at intervals of one per cent per
annum until by 1942 it was scheduled to reach twenty-nine per cent.12 5 For
such use if any as it should make of Sylvania's patents, du Pont agreed to a
similar penalty for exceeding its basic quotas, but it never used Sylvania's
patents.
This settlement apparently was based on a mutual recognition that if
du Pont won the suit Sylvania would be foreclosed from producing cellophane
except on such terms as du Pont might impose, and if Sylvania won both parties
would lose to an intensification of competition. 120 Whatever the purpose of the
penalty royalty, it in effect geared Sylvania's output to du Pont's and gave
du Pont as the dominant firm the power to determine how much moistureproof
cellophane would come on the market. 127
Du Pont's efforts to protect itself from the competition of rival cellophane
producers was the strategy of a monopolist. Its conduct is consistent only with
the belief that in cellophane du Pont had a highly differentiated if not a unique
product in exploiting which it had something to gain by being the single seller.
Structure
Any innovator has a temporary monopoly. The questions crucial to the eco-
nomic significance of his monopoly-to its becoming workably competitive-
are whether rival producers of the identical product appear, or whether sub-
stitute rival products with a sufficiently high cross-elasticity of demand exist
or appear.
An examination of the structure of the cellophane industry and of changes
in it over the years throws light on these questions. In truth, the analysis of con-
duct has already answered the first question. Du Pont's strategy succeeded
in keeping rival cellophane producers except Sylvania out of the domestic
market, and the way in which the two companies settled their patent infringe-
ment suit geared Sylvania's production of cellophane to du Pont's. No other
125. Agreement dated April 26, 1933, GX 2487, pp. 3212-33.
126. Du Pont's patent attorney, after a conference with Sylvania's general counsel,
summed up the situation as follows:
"During the conference Mr. Menken stated that in his opinion the case should be
settled. He said that they were very fearful of what the result would be to their
company in the event they succeeded in having the claims of the patents which are
involved in the litigation held invalid. He seemed to realize the old adage that the
defendant can never win .... If the Du Pont Cellophane Company succeeds and
the patents are held to be infringed, Sylvania Industrial Corporation will be under
injunction and will be obliged to stop manufacturing moistureproof wrapping tissue.
On the other hand, if they succeed in having the broad claims of the patents held
invalid they will throw the art open, so far as the broad claims are concerned, to
anyone and therefore will have additional competition."
Letter dated Aug. 4, 1932, from W. S. Pritchard to B. M. May, Du Pont Cellophane vice
president, GX 2811, pp. 6073-74.
127. In 1945, as the court pointed out, the parties agreed to smaller royalties and aban-
doned the penalties. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 158
(D. Del. 1953).
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rival producer of cellophane had appeared when the Government instituted
its antitrust proceedings.128
The second question-whether there was a high cross-elasticity of demand
-involves an analysis of the market for flexible wrapping materials. The
court concluded that no separate identifiable market for cellophane edsted;
the market for cellophane was identical with that for flexible wrapping ma-
terials.129 It was largely on this finding that the judge based his conclusion as
to the effectiveness of the competition du Pont encountered in selling cello-
pliane.
A characteristic of a competitive market is that the prices of identical prod-
ucts tend to be identical. Where the products are nonidentical, their prices
will reflect the comparative evaluation that marginal buyers (those just in-
duced to buy at the prevailing prices) make of their want-satisfying qualities.
For a product that a consumer regards as better satisfying a particular require-
ment he will be willing to pay more. The higher price that he pays will
result in higher profits to the producer of the preferred article, unless perchance
it costs more to make it. If obstacles to entry do not exist, the higher profits
will attract additional producers, and price must eventually decline until it
equals average cost. If differentiated but competitive products are selling at
competitive even though nonidentical prices, a change in the price of one will
affect the amount of the other that can be sold at prevailing prices. A price
decline in one will decrease the other's sales and hence tend to lower its price.
If the initial price decline reflects a reduction in cost, unless the seller of the
rival product can lower his cost, eventually he must go out of business. Before
he does so he no doubt will lower his price. Thus a decline in the price of
one differentiated product tends to bring a decline in the price of a rival
product. Contrariwise an increase in the demand for products of the same
general class which brings an increase in the price of one of several differ-
entiated products will tend to raise the price of all. In short, although price
differences may exist which reflect differences in cost among differentiated
products and differences in the importance that consumers attach to them, the
prices of the differentiated products tend to move in unison. Cost-price rela-
tionships may thus be helpful in determining whether differentiated products
do in fact meet in a common market.
Does cellophane compete with all other flexible wrapping materials in a
single market? Flexible wrapping materials fall into four major categories:
opaque nonmoistureproof wrapping paper, moistureproof films, nonmoisture-
128. The Government filed its suit December 13, 1947, but the case was not decided
until December 14, 1953; and a third producer, Olin Industries, Inc., began the production
of cellophane in June 1951, while the case was being tried. Testimony of Fred Olsen, Olin
vice president, Transcript of Testimony, p. 6829, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
129. Judge Leahy said: "The relevant market for determining the extent of du Pont's
market control is the market for fle.'dble packaging materials .... " United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 60 (D. Del. 1953).
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proof films, and moistureproof materials other than films. Cellophane by
reason of its qualities and its price is apparently excluded entirely from the
market of the principal opaque nonmoistureproof wrapping paper-kraft.
Kraft paper is used primarily for convenience and protection in handling
packages. The housewife brings her groceries home in it. It sells for less
than cellophane costs, and for general wrapping it meets consumers' needs
better. Clearly its market is not cellophane's.
Cellophane is a film of regenerated cellulose-thin, transparent, nonfibrous.
It is sold in both moistureproof and nonmoistureproof form. Its leading mois-
tureproof film rivals include Saran, cellulose acetate, polyethylene, and pliofilm.
In 1949 their prices ranged from over forty per cent to over 160 per cent
higher than the price of moistureproof cellophane,180 and they were less satis-
factory for most uses to which cellophane was put. Data are not available to
compare the trend of the prices of these films with the prices of cellophane-
except for cellulose acetate, which du Pont itself made-but a du Pont market
analysis report for 1948 makes it clear that du Pont did not regard the rival
films as competitive:
"The principal markets for non-viscose films have been competitive with
Cellophane only to a very minor degree up to this time. Some are used
very little or not at all in the packaging field--others are employed prin-
cipally for specialty uses where Cellophane is not well adapted-none
have been successfully introduced into any of Cellophane's main markets
due to their inherent shortcomings." 18 '
The combination of cellophane's qualities is such that in one important
segment of the flexible packaging material market it has captured the market
completely. In recent years, save during temporary periods of shortage,
cigarette makers have used no other overwrap.'8 2 But in the food packaging
industry, which in 1949 accounted for eighty per cent of du Pont's cellophane
sales, cellophane encounters several lusty rivals-vegetable parchment, grease-
proof paper, glassine, waxed paper, and aluminum foil. In 1949 cellophane
130. This comparison, in terms of prices per thousand square inches, rests on data
appearing in a price survey made for du Pont by Robert Heller & Associates, manage-
ment consultants. DX 995, reproduced in part in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 83 (D. Del. 1953).
131. DX 595, p. 1147. Olin Industries, Inc., later to become the country's third pro-
ducer of cellophane, concluded similarly:
"There are no films currently marketed which are potentially competitive to any
substantial degree in Cellophane's major markets.... Other transparent films will
find their place for those low volume uses which can absorb the additional cost of
the film and which necessitate certain physical properties not possessed by Cello-
phane."
Report on "the evidence in support of entry by Olin Industries into the Cellophane busi-
ness, based on the purchase of patent license and 'know-how' from du Pont," Dec. 15, 19,18,
GX 566, p. 7575.
132. Judge Leahy referred to cellophane's temporary "displacement" by other cigarette
overwraps in the mid-forties, when cellophane was in short supply. United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 108 (D. Del. 1953).
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accounted for 6.8 per cent of the total quantity of selected flexible wrapping
materials (in millions of square inches) sold by nineteen major converters
for wrapping bakery products, 24.4 per cent of that used in wrapping candy,
31.9 per cent of that used in wrapping snacks, 34.9 per cent of that used in
wrapping meat and poultry, 26.6 per cent of that used in wrapping crackers
and biscuits, 47.2 per cent of that used in wrapping fresh produce, and 33.6
per cent of that used in wrapping frozen foods excluding dairy products.133
Certainly on their face these figures do not indicate that cellophane monopo-
lized the market for flexible wrapping materials. Moreover, the court found
that "shifts of business between du Pont cellophane and other flexible packag-
ing materials have been frequent, continuing and contested."1 34 In the face
of these facts and this judgment, how can economists justify the conclusion
that du Pont exercised monopoly power in selling cellophane? First, note
that a monopolist's pricing policy does not guarantee that he will get all the
business he would like to have at any particular moment. His pricing policy
is designed to maximize earnings over some period of time. He may revise
prices from time to time in response to changing cost and demand functions.
But having determined the price at which he will sell for a period of time, he
foregoes business that he might have had at a lower price. If he could isolate
his markets, it would pay him to discriminate among customers and get both
the low-price and the high-price business; but if he cannot, by cutting prices
he will realize less on what he might have sold at the higher price. To compensate
for this, after deciding on a price policy at any particular time he may rely
more on sales effort than on price competition. H. 0. Ladd, director of
du Pont's trade analysis division, put it this way:
"The main competitive materials . . . against which Cellophane competes
are waxed paper, glassine, greaseproof and vegetable parchment paper,
all of which are lower in price than Cellophane. We do not meet this
price competition. Rather, we compete with these materials on the basis
of establishing the value of our own as a factor in better packaging
and cheaper distribution costs and classify as our logical markets those
fields where the properties of Cellophane in relationship to its price can
do a better job for the user."1 35
A more reliable test of monopoly power than the percentage of a broad,
ill-defined market that a particular seller holds is the one set up here-the
relative price movements of the single seller's product and of "competing"
products. Stated in technical terms the question becomes: Is the cross-elas-
ticity of demand so low that du Pont can price cellophane independently and
still- make monopoly profits in selling it?136
133. Id. at 111-13. A detailed comparison appears in the opinion.
134. Id. at 91.
135. GX 5S9, p. 7530.
136. The Supreme Court recognized the significance of cross-elasticity of demand in
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953). It said:
"For every product, substitutes exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully
encompass that infinite range. The circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any
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The course of moistureproof cellophane prices shows that du Pont has
followed a farsighted policy in pricing cellophane. While at any particular
time it has apparently foregone price competition to get business, it has de-
liberately adopted a long-range pricing policy designed to expand sales con-
tinuously. From an average price of $2.508 a pound in 1924, du Pont reduced
cellophane prices every year until 1936, when its prices averaged 41.3 cents a
pound13 7 By 1940 further reductions had brought the annual average price
down to thirty-eight cents a pound. With the war and postwar inflation du Pont
reversed cellophane's price trend. By 1950 it was charging an average of forty-
nine cents a pound. But despite this long downward trend in prices, the princi-
pal type of moistureproof cellophane (300 MST-51) sold continuously at from
two to seven times the price of 25# bleached glassine and from two to four
and a half times the price of 30# waxed paper, its most important rivals.1 8
What is more important, du Pont cellophane prices moved independently of
rival products' prices, which remained relatively stable or moved slightly up-
ward 139 while cellophane prices were dropping sharply. When the war
and postwar inflation brought higher prices for these wrapping materials,
du Pont cellophane, which had continually sold at higher prices, moved up
with the rest, but less rapidly. Thus it continued its relative decline in price.
Such independent price movements suggest noncompetitive pricing as between
cellophane and the rival products. That the sellers of the other wrapping
materials did not reduce their prices as cellophane prices were moving down-
ward indicates a low cross-elasticity of demand between the products. It sug-
gests, although it does not prove, that the rival products were selling too close
to average cost at the time when cellophane, which was continuously higher
in price despite its downtrend, was selling above its average cost. Apparently
rival products were not sufficiently close substitutes to constitute effective
competition with cellophane. 140
other product to which, within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number
of buyers will turn; in technical terms, products whose 'cross-elasticities of demand'
are small."
137. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 82 (D. Del.
1953) (table of annual average prices from 1924 to 1950).
138. Brief for Defendant, Appendix A (graph based on prices per thousand square
inches), United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
139. Bleached glassine prices were unchanged from 1924 to 1933 and again from 1934
to 1938. They rose in 1939 and again in 1940. Waxed paper prices were virtually un-
changed from 1933 to 1940, fluctuating between .5c. and .52c. per thousand square inches.
They increased to .62c. in 1940. Between 1924 and 1928 vegetable parchment prices de-
clined slightly from 1.3c. to 1.0c. per thousand square inches and thereafter remained
relatively stable, moving between .95c. and 1.05c. Bleached greaseproof prices rose from
.45c. per thousand square inches in 1933 to .55c. in 1940. These price comparisons rest on
data collected for du Pont by Robert Heller & Associates, management consultants. DX
994-A. The price of one principal standard type of each material was used.
140. The judgment of a du Pont division manager supports the above conclusion.
During the war and early postwar years increased taxes brought a lower rate of net
earnings on du Pont's cellophane investment, reducing it from 20.4% in 1940 to 11.29 in
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Perfornaznce
Some economists would regard the cellophane industry's record of perform-
ance as good when measured by the course of prices. Certainly du Pont's
long-run pricing policy was farsighted; however, it was not inconsistent
with that of a monopolist. A monopolist interested in maximizing earnings
must not only take account of the short-run effect on profits of price changes
but most also consider their long-run effects on costs and sales. He may find,
as du Pont apparently did, that lower prices eventually increase sales and
thereby lower costs and increase earnings. In determining its long-run pricing
policy du Pont sought larger earnings through increased volume.141 Whether
its pricing policy maximized its earnings is not clear, but that it kept them at
a high level is beyond dispute. From 1924 to 1950 du Pont's rate of operative
earnings (before taxes) on investment in cellophane ranged from 62.4 per cent
in 1928 to 19.1 per cent in 1947. In 1950 it reached a postwar high of 45.3
per cent. Over a twenty-six year period it averaged 34.4 per cent. The rate
of net earnings (after taxes) ranged from 51.5 per cent in 192S to 8.4 per
cent in 1942. In 1950 it reached a postwar high of twenty per cent. Over the
twenty-six year period it averaged 24.2 per cent.142
On their face these look like noncompetitive earning rates. But many factors
besides the intensity of competition affect earnings, and a sustained high rate
of earnings in a particular product does not prove that earnings are monopo-
listic. Cellophane has met a rapidly expanding demand, as have other wrap-
ping materials. Unfortunately data are not available for comparing cello-
1947. 1947 profit and loss statement of du Pont's cellophane division, GX 591, p. 7539. To
reverse this trend du Pont raised cellophane prices from an average of 41.9c. a pound in
1947 to 46c. in 1948. By May 1948, du Pont's rate of earnings on its cellophane investment
had increased to 31%. At this time du Pont's cellophane division manager announced that
"if operative earnings [before taxes] ... of 31 per cent is [sic] considered inadequate, then
an upward revision in prices will be necessary to improve the return." The manager
proposed a schedule of prices to earn about 40%. Du Pont put this into effect in August
1948. Operative earnings for that year averaged only 27.2% (calculated from 1948 profit
and loss statement, GX 577, p. 7323), but by 1949 they had increased to 35.2% and by
1950 to 45.3%. The latter figure represented net earnings of 20% on du Pont's 1950 in-
vestment in cellophane facilities. GX 573(I), p. 8. (This exhibit was impounded by the
court but was cited in the Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, p. 48, and Brief for the
United States, pp. 144-45, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp.
41 (D. Del. 1953).)
141. President Yerkes of Du Pont Cellophane had concluded as early as 1924 that
the company should lower cellophane prices. "[I] think it will undoubtedly increase sales
and widen distribution... Our price I think is too high based purely on manufacturing
cost and too high in comparison with other wrapping papers... ." Memorandum of some
remarks made at a meeting of the board of directors, Du Pont Cellophane Co., Inc.,
Dec. 11, 1924, DX 337, p. 643. Walter S. Carpenter, Jr., chairman of du Pont's board
of directors, testified that "the purpose of reducing our price and also improving our quality
was to broaden our market. . . " Transcript of Testimony, p. 6278, United States v.
E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. DeL 1953).
142. Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Compelition, 45 Am.
EcoN. REv. 29,57 n.107, 59 (1955).
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phane's earning rates with those of rival materials. However, du Pont's rate
of earnings on cellophane--of which for half a dozen years du Pont was the
sole domestic producer and thereafter until 1951, with Sylvania, one of two
producers--can be compared with du Pont's earnings on its rayon investment
before World War II. Many similarities in the two industries justify the
comparison. Du Pont produced both products. They stem from the same
raw materials. They were initially both produced under noncompetitive con-
ditions. Both enjoyed tariff protection. Both have close substitutes. Both
have been characterized by rapid expansion in consumption, rapid reduction
in cost, and a rapid decline in price. The single relevant difference is the
structure of the two industries. Rayon production began as a monopoly, with
American Viscose Corporation the sole producer until after World War I,
when du Pont entered the field; by 1930 eighteen rivals confronted the two
leaders.143 In 1920, when du Pont first engaged in rayon production, Ameri-
can Viscose made 64.2 per cent on its investment before taxes.144 Entry was
relatively free, however, and the high rate of earnings attracted newcomers.
By 1929 earnings for the industry averaged 18.1 per cent before taxes;
du Pont made nineteen per cent.1 45 With six more firms entering the industry
in 1930, the average return for the industry was only five per cent, and
du Pont lost money, it losses equaling 0.9 per cent of its investment. During
the next eight years du Pont averaged 7.5 per cent on its rayon investment.1 40
On cellophane it averaged over twenty-five per cent. This significant differ-
ence in earnings probably reflects the relative intensity of competition.
Conclusions
The foregoing analysis indicates that cellophane production has not con-
formed to the conception of workable competition developed herein. Du
Pont's conduct (strategy) was that of a monopolist. The industry's structure
has been oligopolistic; and the market for cellophane, while not clearly defined,
is scarcely identical with that for flexible wrapping materials. If entry had
been free and genuine rivals had confronted du Pont in selling cellophane, 147
du Pont would have been forced to sell it for less and would have made a
lower rate of return.
143. MARKHAM, COMPETITION IN THE RAYON INDUSTRY 46 (1952).
144. FTC, INVESTMENTS, PROFITS, AND RATES OF RETURN FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES
17985 (a special report prepared for the TNEC, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1941)).
145. Id. at 17899, 17990, 17998.
146. Ibid.
147. Correspondence between Lammot du Pont and L. A. Yerkes, president of du Pont
Cellophane, reveals the attitude of potential rivals towards competing with du Pont (and
incidentally du Pont's attitude towards the competition of rivals). Written at a time when
the Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. had considered entering the field, du Pont's letter of
December 2, 1931, which was based on an hour's conversation with representatives of the
Union Carbide & Carbon, stated: "They assured me repeatedly they did not wish to rush
into anything, most of all a competitive situation with du Pont. Their whole tone was most
agreeable .... In the course of the conversation, various efforts at co-operation between
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But the fact that cellophane has not been sold under conditions of work-
able competition does not mean that the industry's performance has been
wholly bad. Far from it. Du Pont has continuously improved the product,
developed new types, found new uses for them, lowered its price, helped con-
verters and packagers in developing new markets, and developed and improved
packaging machinery. It has been a most progressive rival wherever flexible
wrapping materials are sold. The district court would have been on sounder
ground had it concluded that cellophane has been sold under conditions of
workable monopoly, and it is this confusion between workable monopoly and
workable competition that makes this decision a bad precedent. Rarely does a
monopolist sell in a completely isolated market. In one sense every want-
satisfying product must compete with all others for the consumer's dollar, and
the rivalry among the sellers of rival products may be intelligent and vigorous.
But it is a deceptive rivalry, which if accepted by the courts as a substitute for
competition will narrow greatly the applicability and probably the usefulness
of the Sherman Act.
THE TIN CAN IN]DUSTRY
The district court's decision in the 1916 Amcrican Can Company case14 8
affords a striking illustration of the unfortunate implications of the rule of
reason as laid down in Standard Oil and American Tobacco. The organizers
of the American Can Company with a single exception were promoters, not
canmakers. They set out to monopolize canmaking 149 and to make money in
the manipulation of securities. Immediately they succeeded in both endeavors.
American Can acquired over a hundred canmaking plants, for most of which
it paid exorbitant prices,15 0 and two-thirds of which it dismantled within two
years. Together these plants accounted for ninety per cent or more of the
cans sold in the domestic market.151 To make their monopoly enduring the
Carbide and du Pont were referred to, and in every case assurances of their desire to work
together, given." GX 4381, p. 4300.
148. United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859 (D. Md. 1916), decree rendered,
234 Fed. 1019 (D. Md.), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921). Statements of fact in the
text about the can industry in 1916 and earlier are based on the opinion in this case unless
otherwise indicated.
149. Said the court, "What has been proved is ... that the defendant was organized
to monopolize interstate trade in cans.... " United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed.
859, 861 (D. Md. 1916). "There can be no possible explanation of such transactions, ex-
cept that the defendant and its promoters wanted to extinguish competition and did not
stop to inquire how much it would cost to do so." Id. at 877.
150. judge Rose found that the prices paid ranged from one and a half to twenty-five
times the value of the property acquired, and he said that for half or probably a third of
the $25,000,000 given in cash or capital stock American could have "purchased land, erected
buildings, and equipped them with machinery which would have had a greater capacity,
could have operated at a smaller cost, and would have been at least as well, if not better,
located...." Id. at 870-71.
151. Id. at 869. In arriving at the 909 figure the court noted that one witness had
testified that be believed that American Can had at the outset acquired from 95 to 935 of
the country's total capacity for making cans for sale.
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promoters obtained agreements from most of the former plant owners not to
engage in canmaking for fifteen years within three thousand miles of Chicago,
and they worked out various arrangements with the manufacturers of can-
making machinery designed to prevent potential rivals from becoming can-
makers. 15 2 Exercising its monopoly power, American Can obtained secret
rebates from the American Sheet and Tin Plate Company, a United States Steel
subsidiary, amounting over a twelve-year period to $9,000,000. As had the
Standard Oil and American Tobacco Companies, American Can operated
bogus independents.
Despite its having achieved at the outset a virtual monopoly of canmaking
and despite its early "bad" conduct, the court found American's contemporary
performance good. The company made good cans and sold them at prices
against which customers did not complain. The company claimed (as the court
put it, "with much reason") that it was the first to study can industry prob-
lems systematically and scientifically, and it spared no effort to meet its
customers' needs. It had a more varied line of equipment than its rivals and
"having great facilities habitually used them to give intelligent, courteous, and
kindly aid [to its customers]. It is unmistakably popular in the trade." 163
With its plants widely dispersed it could make prompt deliveries, which the
court regarded as perhaps "its most valuable service to the trade."'1 4
Not only did the court find its performance good, but it found that American
Can had reformed its conduct: "[T] he testimony has disclosed nothing in the
recent conduct of defendant, other than that which the government particu-
larizes, to which any serious exception, or indeed any exception at all, can be
taken."155
And finally the industry's structure had changed somewhat. The court
found that American Can by 1913 was selling only about half the cans sold in
the United States. Continental Can Company sold approximately one-fourth
of the cans not sold by American, and numerous smaller concerns accounted
for the balance. Although he recognized that the American Can Company had
power over the market, Judge Rose was "frankly reluctant to destroy so finely
adjusted an industrial machine as the record shows defendant to be."' 1 0 In
considering the legal principles involved he asserted that
152. About these arrangements the court said:
"The record amply justifies the assertion that for a year or two after defendant's
formation it was practically impossible for any competitor to obtain the most modern,
up-to-date, automatic machinery, and that the difficulties in the way of getting such
machinery were not altogether removed until the expiration of the six years for
which the defendant had bound up the leading manufacturers of such machinery."
Id. at 875.
153. Id. at 897.
154. Id. at 896.
155. Id. at 881. "The competitors of the defendant are satisfied.... As has sometimes
been suggested, it seems to hold an umbrella over them." Id. at 898.
156. Id. at 903.
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"one of the designs of the framers of the Anti-Trust Act was to prevent
the concentration in a few hands of control over great industries. They
preferred a social and industrial state in which there should be many
independent producers. Size and power are themselves facts some of
whose consequences do not depend upon the way in which they were
created or in which they are used. It is easy to conceive that they might
be acquired honestly and used as fairly as men who are in business for
the legitimate purpose of making money for themselves and their asso-
ciates could be expected to use them, human nature being what it is, and
for all that constitute a public danger, or at all events give rise to difficult
social, industrial and political problems."'0 7
Then turning his back on his own conception of the Sherman Act, the
judge found the American Can's power, though great, was limited by "a large
volume of actual competition and to a still greater extent by . . . potential
competition. . . ."158 In a decree that left American Can's structure undis-
turbed, Judge Rose expressed the hope that "all potential restraints upon free
competition . . . will pass away as speedily without as with dissolution."
"Dissolution," he said, "will cause far more loss and business disturbance
than will attend the gradual re-establishment of competitive conditions by the
play of economic forces."'159 Still somewhat uneasy, the court retained the
bill and reserved the right to decree dissolution should "the size and power
of the defendant" ever be "used to the injury of the public" or should Ameri-
can Can's size and power, "without being intentionally so used," give it "a
dominance or control over the industry, or some portion of it, so great as to
make dissolution or other restraining decree of the court expedient."'HO When
the Supreme Court refused to dissolve the United States Steel Corporation
in 1920, the Government abandoned its appeal in the Can case.101
Did later developments in the industry warrant the court's optimism about
the power of existing competition and the development of potential competi-
tion? Did the industry become workably competitive? To answer these ques-
tions an analysis of the industry's structure, conduct, and performance since
the 1916 decision is necessary.
Structure
The American Can Company today is a far larger concern than it was when
the court refused to dissolve it. In 1913 its total sales were $39,000,000;162
in 1954 they were $652,000,000,163 an increase of 1,572 per cent. Its share of
157. Id. at 901.
158. Id. at 903.
159. United States v. American Can Co., 234 Fed. 1019, 1021 (D. Md. 1916) (decree).
160. Ibid.
161. CCH, TErE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws WITH SummARY OF CASES, 1890-1951, at
104 (1952).
162. HEssioN, COMPETITION IN THE METAL FOOD CONTAINER INDUSTRY 1916-1946, at
39 (1948).
163. Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys, Containers C4-10 (April 21, 1955).
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total domestic production increased from about one-third in 1913 to over forty
per cent in 1946, and in that year it sold 46.4 per cent of all the cans sold in the
United States.1 6 4 Its total assets grew from $30,500,000 in 1901100 to $432,-
000,000 in 1953.166 Except for the sale of $69,000,000 in debentures and
$25,000,000 of common stock, since 1939 American has financed its expansion
by the investment of retained earnings.16 7
But the can industry has grown tremendously since 1913, and some com-
panies have expanded more rapidly than American Can. First among its rivals
is the Continental Can Company. In 1904 one of the organizers of American
took the initiative in organizing Continental, when he "and several others
decided to break away from the combine" and bought the patents of one of
the few canmaking machinery companies not controlled by American." 8 In
1913 Continental produced approximately one-eighth of the cans produced
for sale in the United States--one-fourth as many as American. Its sales
totalled $7,185,000.169 By 1954 they totalled $616,000,000,170 an increase of
8,700 per cent, and they equalled 92.9 per cent of American's total sales.
Together these two companies in 1946 accounted for eighty per cent of all
cans made for sale in the United States ;171 in 1954 they accounted for seventy-
one per cent of the industry's nearly $1,400,000,000 sales.172
American and Continental have in recent years met the rivalry of four
medium-sized companies, National Can Corporation, Pacific Can Company
(which merged with National in December 1954),17 Crown Cork and Seal
Company (which in December 1953 merged with its wholly owned sub-
sidiary, Crown Can Company), and Heekin Can Company, all producing
both packers' and general line cans.1 74 In 1946 National, Pacific, Crown, and
164. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 21-22 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
165. American Can paid about $23,500,000 for the ninety-five plants turned over to
it "on the day after it was organized." United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859,
870 (D. Md. 1916). "The promoters were to furnish $7,000,000 cash, or, in all, in stock and
money they were to lay out $30,500,000, for which they received $39,000,000 preferred and
$39,000,000 of common stock." Id. at 873. Most of the new company's cash went into the
purchase of stocks of merchandise in the plants it took over, and "it really began life with-
out a free dollar to its name, .. ." Id. at 874.
166. MooDY'S INDUSTRIALS 1733-36 (1954).
167. Ibid.
168. Sheehan, Continental Can's Big Push, Fortune, April 1955, p. 121.
169. HESSioN, COMPETITION IN THE METAL FOOD CONTAINER INDUSTRY 1916-1946,°at
39 (1948).
170. STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, Contabiers C4-11 (April 21, 1955).
171. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 22 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
172. STANDARD & POoW'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, Containers C4-5 (April 21, 1955).
173. National Can Corporation purchased the capital stock of Pacific Can Company at
$28.57 a share. The merger combined twelve plants expected to have a total annual sales
volume of more than $80,000,000. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1954, p. 20, col. 2.
174. Packers' cans, sometimes called sanitary cans, are closed by machines and are used
in the packing of fruits and vegetables. General line cans embrace a large number of
specialized cans, the most important being those used in canning coffee, shortening, beer,
motor oil, and chemicals. Although American is the major manufacturer of cans for beer,
1150 [Vol. 64':1107
THE RULE OF REASON
Heekin together accounted for only 13.6 per cent of the total can sales in the
United States ;175 with American and Continental they accounted for 93.6
per cent. Threescore or more minor companies, most of them producing
only general line cans, accounted for the remaining 6.4 per cent.170 Those
that produce packers' cans frequently do so for a single canning company,
to which they are a sort of satellite.
That two companies accounted for approximately eighty per cent of the
cans sold in the United States in 1946 and four more for most of the remainder,
does not reveal adequately the significance of structure to competition in the
sale of cans. Because cans are bulky and transportation costs relatively heavy,
they are generally sold in local or regional markets from plants located close
to their customers. American, with fifty-eight widely scattered can factories, 17'
sells in all United States markets and in Hawaii, Alaska, and Canada as well.
Continental-and only Continental-with forty-one can factories,1 78 challenges
-American's leadership in most of these markets. American has supplied virtu-
ally the entire sardine canning industry in Maine from its plant at Lubec.7'
In Utah and Havaii American has a complete monopoly, and in Alaska it
has eighty per cent of the business.'80 In California the National-Pacific
combine is the only substantial rival of American-and Continental, and in the
Pacific Northwest, American and Continental meet no effective competition.' 8s
Canmaking is highly concentrated, but canmakers meet no similar concen-
tration on the buying side of the market. They sell packers' cans to thousands
of food canners. These are widely distributed throughout the country, with a
tendency to cluster around the production center of the crop they pack.
Few are large enough to exert any influence on the price of cans, but some
large buyers have been able to get cans on better terms than their smaller
rivals. In 1941 American's fifteen largest purchasers bought only about one-
third (in dollar value) of all the cans it sold; six companies bought about
coffee, shortening, and meat, conditions of entry and economics of scale in the making of
general line cans permit small manufacturers to get into this sector of the industry more
easily than into the making of packers' cans.
175. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 22 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
176. Id. at 22 n.9. Sheehan, supra note 168, at 122, places the number of small, regional
canmakers operating today at "eighty-odd." Standard & Poor's say there are approximately
100 active companies in the metal can field, "about one-third of which are packers operating
captive plants." STANDARD & POOW'S INDUsTRY SuRvYs, Containers C4-5 (April 21, 1955).
177. In addition to its metal container plants American operates three fiber can and
package plants and eight factories for the manufacture and repair of canmaking machinery.
MOODY'S INDUSTRLA S 1734 (1954).
178. Continental also has fourteen fiber and paper container plants, nine bag and ftemi-
ble package material plants, three crown cap plants, two defense plants, one plastic plant,
and eight factories for the manufacture and repair of canmaking machinery. Id. at 2159.
179. Hession, The Tin Can Industry, in THE STRu'cruR or AmEWrICA. I:.uusTnY 409
(Adams ed., rev. ed. 1954).
180. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
181. Hession, The Tin Can Industrv, in THE STRUCTrRE OF AMERIcAN INLSTrRy 409
(Adams ed., rev. ed. 1954).
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forty-two per cent of the packers' cans American sold.18 2 Continental's sell-
ing was probably less concentrated. Three of the country's four largest canners
packed only thirteen per cent of the country's canned vegetables and thirty
per cent of its canned fruit in 1937.183 Thousands of other canners accounted for
the balance. Decentralization in food canning suggests that countervailing
power affords inadequate protection against such power as the two big can-
makers may have.
But entry, into canmaking is relatively easy. Canmaking on an economical
scale requires a relatively small amount of capital. 184 Control of neither patents
nor canmaking machinery affords a serious obstacle to entry.18 5 On the other
hand, while the technological optimum is relatively small, a firm with several
plants so located that cross-shipments are not exorbitant can more readily meet
the seasonal demands of its customers than can single-plant firms. Moreover, the
firm large enough to engage in research in canmaking and can using has a
distinct advantage over the smaller firm. Service to canners and the develop-
ment of cans for new uses are important functions of the larger canmakers.
But the principal obstacle to the growth of smaller firms has been the conduct
of the large ones.
Conduct
In 1916 the district court found that the American Can Company had dis-
continued such of its conduct as reflected an intent to monopolize. As the court
put it, "[N]obody in the trade feels that the defendant is hurting anybody,
or for a number of years past has hurt anybody, or 'has tried to." 180
Yet as previously stated, American Can's superior bargaining power had
enabled it to get secret rebates from the American Sheet and Tin Plate Coni-
pany in buying tin plate.187 The cost of tin plate is the largest single item of
expense in making cans, constituting approximately sixty-five per cent of the
182. These calculations are based on data appearing in Professor James W. McKie's
forthcoming study of the metal container industry. The data are from Exhibits 63 and
3124, United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
183. Hession, The Tin Can Industry, in THE STRucruRE OF AMERIcAX INDUSTRY 410
(Adams ed., rev. ed. 1954).
184. According to McKie's study, supra note 182, a general line can plant with eight
production lines and an annual capacity of 500,000,000 cans would cost about $7,000,000,
including land, buildings, machinery, and lithographing equipment. A packers' can plant
not requiring lithographing equipment would no doubt cost less but because of seasonal
variation in demand would probably produce only half as many cans.
185. No basic patents block entry, but the leading producers have many improve-
ment patents-American's and Continental's running into the hundreds. Crown Can Com-
pany apparently had little difficulty in getting the necessary machinery when it went into
business in 1936. Hession credited an executive of American Can with saying that no
other can manufacturer really needs American's patents. They have their own. I-IsoN,
COMPETITION IN THE METAL Fool CONTAINER INDUSTRY 1916-1946, at 169 (1948).
186. United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859, 897 (D. Md. 1916).
187. American's top executives had taken great pains to conceal its favored treatment
not only from the trade but from other company executives as well. Only two of them
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total cost. American Can's secret rebate amounted to about sixty-four cents
on the tin plate required to make 1,000 3-pound packers' cans. This, as tie
court put, was "far from negligible" and in the competitive struggle "might
well have proved a decisive factor."' s8 But the court found that "the prefer-
ential ended in April, 1913, some seven months before this suit was brought."180
Despite the court's finding, two decades later negotiations on the Steel Code
under the National Recovery Administration revealed that American Can was
again receiving a secret concession-7Y per cent-in buying tin plate from
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation (American Sheet and Tin Plate's suc-
cessor and a United States Steel Corporation subsidiary). I° °
WNhile American Can was receiving confidential discounts from the "official"
price of tin plate, it was tying its can prices to published tin plate prices. 01
Each year Carnegie-Illinois and American Can negotiated the official price,
which became the price at which Carnegie-Illinois and other tin plate com-
panies offered tin plate to all other buyers. Other large canmakers followed
American Can's lead in tying tin can prices to tin plate prices. American
Can in this way for many years was the price leader. The smaller can-
making companies, whose service to canners is far less adequate, customarily
sold at slightly lower prices. Continental, though generally selling at prices
identical with those of American, did not always rely on its independent dis-
cretion in doing so. In truth, at times it has apparently conspired with Ameri-
can in fixing prices, allocating customers, dividing markets, and assigning
fields of production. At any rate on June 26, 1946, a federal grand jury in-
dicted both -American and Continental and seven of their officers on a charge
of criminal conspiracy. 92 All the defendants pleaded nolo contenderc and on
January 28, 1947 paid maximum fines under the Sherman Act.
Two years later a district court in civil proceedings against American and
Continental concluded:
"The pattern of evidence herein suggests more than a following on the
part of Continental of the prices fixed and established by American....
were in on it. TNEC, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF EcONO.sIc PowR, Hearings,
pt. 20, at 10789 (1939).
188. United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859, 875 (D. Aid. 1916).
189. Id. at 885.
190. TNEC, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, Hearings, pt
20, at 10777-78 (1939). When the code of fair competition for the steel industry made this
discount applicable to the trade generally, American Can insisted that under its contract
with Carnegie-Illinois it was entitled to a further discount of 7%%. When the steel com-
pany rejected this interpretation, American Can filed suit. In an out-of-court settlement
Carnegie-Illinois paid American $2,250,000. Id. at 10778-79.
191. Before 1939, in contracts with its customers American Can stated the price for
each standard size of packers' cans and established a scale of differentials for increasing
or decreasing can prices with each 10c. change in Carnegie-Illinois' official price per base
box of 100-pound coke plate, 14" x 20", 112 sheets to the box, f.o.b. mill, Pittsburgh, Pa.
TNEC, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF EcoNoMIC PoWER, Hearings, pt. 20, at 10763
(1939).
192. United States v. American Can Co., Cr. No. 30323-S (N.D. Cal. June 26, 1946).
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American and Continental, through their officers, agents, and servants,
did directly agree to fix prices. This is manifest from the evidence, as
well as the pattern of the price lists which appeared in the exhibits."'u 9
In reaching this conclusion the court quoted Justice Douglas's characterization
of such arrangements as "monopoly competition"---"a regime of friendly alli-
ances, of quick and easy accommodation of prices even without the benefit of
trade associations, of what Brandeis said was euphemistically called 'coopera-
tion.' "194
While serving as a price leader in the industry, American Can engaged
in other practices inconsistent with workable competition. Fifteen months after
the court had refused to destroy "so finely adjusted" an industrial machine,
a Federal Trade Commission investigation revealed that American Can was
requiring the lessees of its closing machines (which it leased but would not
sell) to buy cans exclusively from it.10 5 American Can agreed to eliminate
the tying clause, and on April 29, 1924, the Federal Trade Commission dis-
missed its complaint.10 6 A quarter of a century later a federal district court
found that American Can was accomplishing indirectly what it had previously
achieved directly by contract.10 7 In leasing its closing machines American
timed the lease to any customer to run concurrently with the customer's
contract for the purchase of cans. In selling cans it generally contracted to
supply a customer's total requirements for long periods of time (three to
twenty years throughout much of American Can's existence, and a standard
five years shortly before the 1949 antitrust case), and it leased closing ma-
chines only to its own customers. American Can's executives coached its sales-
men to include no tying clause in a lease but to make certain that the termin-
able dates for a customer's lease and for its requirements contract should be
the same. If a customer did not renew its purchase contract, American Can
did not renew its lease. Most of American Can's closing machines were not
protected by patents, and with a slight adjustment could be used to close cans
made by other manufacturers; and so American charged below-cost rentals for
its machines, in order to foreclose competition from other machinery makers
and to keep its lessees content with its system of tying the leases to its long-
term requirements contracts.9 8 In this way American Can continued to be
193. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 33-34 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
194. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318 (1949), quoted in United
States v. American Can Co., supra note 193, at 33.
195. Apparently the FTC did not publish a report on its 1917 investigation of American
Can. The district court described its outcome in United States v. American Can Co., 87
F. Supp. 18, 25 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
196. The complaint, issued May 1, 1918, had also charged American Can with dis-
criminating in price and using long-term contracts to stifle competition. The Commission
did not assign reasons for dismissing it. The American Can Co., 7 F.T.C. 541 (1924).
197. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949). Statements
of fact in the rest of the paragraph are based on this opinion.
198. The court found that this practice "has tended to restrict the market for closing
machine manufacturers and has limited the number of concerns engaged in this business."
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the sole supplier of most of its customers, and in addition made it difficult
for new canmakers to get into business and for those already in it to grow.'"
The conduct of the leading firms has made it difficult for other can sellers
to grow. Have can buyers fared better? Lawsuits against American Can
reveal that by discriminating among its customers in pricing and servicing
cans it has placed small canners at a disadvantage. It has favored large buyers
by secret discounts, has loaned them its dosing machines without charge, and
has granted them bonuses and special allowances. The courts have found
that its preferential prices were not justified by differences in costs nor made
in good faith to meet competition. 200 Such practices reflect in part the greater
buying power of the large canners, who continuously hold over their suppliers
the threat of making their own cans 201 and who with Continental's growth
have been able to play Continental against American Can. After court pro-
ceedings exposed American's discriminatory practices and some of the injured
parties collected treble damages, American tried to bring its practices within
the law. At any rate, it established quantity discounts and made them available
to any buyer who qualified; but by basing its discounts on annual cumulative
purchases it placed them beyond the reach of small buyers and in 1949 the
district court held this practice unlawful.
On the whole, American Can's conduct since the 1916 decision has scarcely
justified the court's optimism about the restoration of a free market. What
about its performance?
Performance
By negotiating the price of tin plate annually, and tying the price of tin
cans to it, American Can made the price of tin cans relatively stable: tin can
prices have customarily remained unchanged throughout the calendar year and
sometimes for considerably longer periods.202
United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18,24 (N.D. Cal. 1949). The court quoted
the government's brief for the point that of the thirty-four canmakers named as "com-
petitors" of American Can in the trial examiner's report on the facts in the Federal Trade
Commission's 1924 proceedings, see note 196 supra, only six "are now in existence, a
mortality rate of 82.' United States v. American Can Co., supra at 22 n.9.
199. The court concluded that "the five year requirements contracts and closing machine
leases unreasonably restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The evidence dis-
closes that competitors have been foreclosed from a substantial market by the contracts
and leases." Id. at 29.
200. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929);
American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930) ; Bruce's Juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), off'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951); Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can
Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1949), rev'd, 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951) (plaintiff
failed to establish ascertainable damage proximately resulting from discriminations).
201. Among the large packers who now make their cans are Campbell Soup, the
country's third largest canmaker, Heinz, Pet Milk, Carnation Co., Sherwin-Williams, and
Texas Co. STAwARD & Poon's IxDusTRY SuRvEys, Containers C4-5 (April 21, 1955).
202. They were stable throughout 1924 and 1925 and at a slightly lower level through-
out 1926 and 1927; they dropped again in 1928 but showed little change through 1929,
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Stability in can prices throughout the canning season eliminates risk and
speculation in buying cans and contributes to a more orderly marketing of
tin cans and of canned foods, but cyclical and secular stability in can prices
has no such virtue. Stable prices in the face of long-run changes in demand
and cost functions interfere with the effectiveness of the pricing mechanism.
They tend to place the burden of readjustments to changing demand-supply
relationships largely on the canners, to the benefit of the canmakers. Tin cans
cost almost as much as the food they contain: in 1918, for example, canners
paid thirty-three cents for a dozen No. 2 cans; but they paid only thirty-four
cents for the corn to fill them, and thirty-six cents for the same amount of
string beans.20 3 Between 1929 and their depression lows the wholesale prices
of canned vegetables and fruits fell twenty-five per cent and forty per cent
respectively, while between 1929 and 1933 American Can's published prices
for No. 2 cans declined less than thirteen per cent. By 1934 canned vegetable
prices had risen about six per cent above their 1932 level and canned fruit
prices about tventy-two per cent; the price of No. 2 cans had risen to within
less than half of one per cent of the 1929 level. The prices of canned fruits
and vegetables fell sharply in 1935 and 1937 and reached their low points in
1938; in 1938 American's published price of No. 2 cans rose slightly.204 Com-
petition among food growers and food canners has traditionally been very
effective, and in the absence of governmental controls neither group has had
a mechanism for shielding itself from the impact of market forces. Such price
behavior not only placed canners at a sharp economic disadvantage; it no
doubt contributed to the high mortality rate in the canning industry."05
1930, and 1931.; they were lower in 1932 and reached their depression low point in 1933.
They were sharply higher by 1934 and remained unchanged until the end of 1936. In 1937
they fell to their 1933 level, at which level after minor fluctuations they were stabilized by
wartime controls. Hession, The Tit Can Industry, in THE STRucruE OF AMERicAN
INDUSTRY 423 (Adams ed., rev. ed. 1954).
203. FTC, REPORT ON CANNED FOODS tables 4, 8, at 26, 30 (1918).
204. HEssioN, COMPETITION IN THE METAL FOOD CONTAINER INDUSTRY 1916-1946,
charts VI, VII, at 222, 227 (1948). Apparently embarrassed by the disparity between their
earnings and those of their customers, see note 205 in!ra, canmakers granted their customers
"rebates equivalent to 25 cents a box on tin plate purchases for 1938." PooR's InDUsTm
AND INVESTMENT SURVEYS, Container Manufacturing C3-8 (Dec. 19, 1940).
205. While some canners had prospered, a survey by the National Canners Association
reveals that by 1938 more than half the canners in business at the beginning of 1929 had
disappeared. The study recognized that not all disappearances represented liquidation.
Some were due to changes of name, death of owners, mergers, and the like. But it
concluded that the actual annual mortality rate in the years covered was about 7%. Na-
tional Canners Association, Some Phases of the Canning Industry, Supplement to the
Information Letter, Jan. 3, 1942, quoted in HEssioN, COMPETITION IN THE METAL FOOD
CONTAINER INDUSTRY 1916-1946, at 254 n.69 (1948). Fortune in 1934 in commenting on
the divergence of price behavior had the following to say:
"American and Continental make cans, but they never fill them. That is the can-
ner's job. And the canner is at present an extremely depressed individual. Van
Camp's is in bankruptcy. Hawaiian Pineapple has been reorganized ... , Libby,
McNeil & Libby, operating sixty-three canneries, lost $6,248,000 for the year end-
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But the canners were not the only ones to suffer from the failure of can
prices to respond more promptly to market forces. Between 1934 and 1939
out of every dollar spent at wholesale for canned tomatoes, corn, and peas
in No. 2 cans, from 22.5 to 40.6 cents went to can manufacturers. 2W Assuming
that on the average the cost of cans represents thirty per cent of the total
cost of canned foods, and taking 1939 consumption as a normal year, a three
per cent reduction in the price of cans if passed on to consumers would have
reduced their living costs by $6,000,000 a year.20 7 Plagued as the country
was by unemployment and low national income during the 1930's, such a price
reduction would without doubt have contributed to the general welfare.
W1Vhile canners and consumers were adversely affected by the conduct of
American Can, the company fared relatively well. During the ten years from
1930 through 1939 its net revenue averaged 9.7 per cent on its capitalization;
and although between 1929 and 1932 American's rate of earnings declined by
more than fifty per cent, it earned over six per cent on its capitaization.2m 8
During the same period the net income of 728 industrial companies declined
ninety-four per cent, and many of them suffered severe losses. -0 During
the generally more prosperous years 1922-1928 inclusive American earned
at a slightly higher rate, 10.1 per cent. This compared with an average return
of 9.7 per cent for 2,046 manufacturing corporations.2 10
An examination of American's contribution to the advance of technology
reveals a better picture. It has taken its research opportunities seriously and
has improved both the making and the use of cans. It opened its first laboratory
in 1906 with a research staff of thirty-five. In 1926 it launched its central
laboratory at 'Maywood, Illinois, operating on a far larger scale. By develop-
ing the Johnson double-seamer and the so-called inverted type of lock and
lap seam it made the manufacture of cans almost wholly automatic.2 1 By
substituting the "roll form" body-maker for the "wing form," American in-
creased can output per machine from 150 cans a minute to 200, later to 300, and
ing March 4, 1933. Hundreds of small canners have gone out of business. But the
can maker is still prosperous.... [T]he two big container corporations . . .are
embarrassed because they are so much more prosperous than their customers and
none release sales figures for fear that the customers might w-ant them to reduce
their prices.'
"Profits in Cans'" Fortune, April, 1934, pp. 77-78.
206. TNEC, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTaATION OF Eco. OMic PoWER, Hearings, pt.
20, exhibit No. 1402, at 10989 (1939).
207. Computed from data in U.S. DEP'T OF CoMmE.CE, STATISTICAL ABsTAcr OF TUF
U--rrEn STATES 648, 695 (1943). The wholesale value of canned food produced in 1939
amounted to roughly $700,000,000.
208. These calculations are based on HEssioN, Com=mrrion IN THE METAL. FOOD
CONTAINER INDUSTRY 1916-1946, table 26, at 245 (1948).
209. Id. at 160.
210. Id. at 159; EPsTEIN, INDUSTRIAL PROFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1934).
211. HESSlON, COMiPETITION IN THE METAL FOOD CONTAINER INDUSTRY 1916-1946,
at 277 (1948).
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eventually to 400.212 Cooperating with steel companies, its research staff has
greatly improved the quality of tin plate. It has encouraged its employees to
perfect new ideas: in 1943 alone they obtained over a hundred patents, to that
date an all-time record. 213 Its service to canners has been a distinctive feature
of its sales technique. Its sales engineering division has assisted in installing
the company's machines in customers' plants and in designing the most
efficient plant layout. In short, American has been a pacemaker in tech-
nology.2 14 Only Continental has rivaled it in this field.
But in evaluating its conduct and overall performance it is difficult to see
how economists could characterize the industry as having been workably
competitive. Those who know it best have not done so.216 Nor did a federal
court in 1949. The court recognized that American as price leader dominated
the can market and that the preferential treatment given big buyers-together
with American's long-term requirements contracts and its practice of co-
ordinating and timing its closing machine leases with its purchase contracts
-had served as an effective obstacle to entry and had blocked expansion by
small companies.2 16
The 1950 Antitrust Decrees
The consequences of the 1950 decrees against both Continental and Ameri-
can 217 seem to have demonstrated the validity of the district court's findings.
The decrees prohibited American and Continental from offering buyers annual
cumulative volume discounts or discriminating among buyers except on a
212. Id. at 261.
213. Id. at 171,
214. It still is. When the Korean hostilities and the government's stockpiling led to
shortages of tin, American Can developed special coatings which permanently replaced
tin in some applications. In 1954 it reported that the motor oil industry was using almost
exclusively cans containing no tin or solder. STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEvS,
Containers C4-2 (April 21, 1955).
215. Hession in discussing "the record in retrospect" in 1954 stated: "Our study dis-
closes that Continental Can has grown, but American Can has not declined relatively, so
that a condition of near-duopoly has been created .... [P] rice leadership and price stabili-
zation . . .has [sic] denied canners and consumers most of the savings made possible by
technological progress." Hession, The Tin Can Industry, in THE STRucrunE OF AMEMeAN
INDUSTRY 432 (Adams ed., rev. ed. 1954). Hession recognized obstacles to entry as having
been one of the principal obstacles to workable competition and characterized the 1950
antitrust decrees as "a major effort to correct this condition." Id. at 441. About the
prospects he expressed a wait-and-see attitude. McKie's analysis of developments since
the decree is more optimistic. He concludes, "A forecast of workable competition appears
to be justified." McKie, The Decline of Monopoly in the Metal Container Industry, 45
Am. EcoN. REv. 499, 508 (1955).
216. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
217. Continental on June 26, 1950, agreed to a consent decree imposing substantially
the same prohibitions on it as those imposed on American. United States v. Continental
Can Co., 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 1162680 (N.D. Cal. 1950). The decree against American
was filed June 22, 1950. United States v. American Can Co., 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 1162679
(N.D. Cal. 1950).
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basis of actual cost savings; from entering into requirements contracts ex-
tending beyond a year; and from conditioning the sale or lease of closing
machines on the use of the lessor's cans directly or by any subterfuge. The
court also ordered each defendant to sell such closing machines as it then had,
giving preference to existing lessees, and any it might build within ten years.
According to MccKie the industry has promptly taken advantage of the oppor-
tunities that the decrees have opened to it, and the industry's performance
reflects its greater freedom. He finds that by the middle of 1954 canners had
bought over seventy-five per cent of the closing machines they held under lease
from American and Continental in 1950; that the abandonment of leasing
will broaden markets for the independent closing machine manufacturers; that
exclusive supplier-customer relations are breaking down; that open-order
purchasing has greatly increased; that small finns are now getting a part of
the business previously done by the large suppliers and their market position
has thereby been greatly strengthened; that tin plate prices are becoming more
flexible and open-order purchasing of tin plate has increased; that rivalry
between American and Continental has intensified; that American's price
leadership has become wholly barometric; and that the inability of the domin-
ant firms to give large canners preferential treatment is making the threat of
integration a more effective check against their exploiting the market.2 18
All economists may not share McKie's optimism,2 1 but few are likely to
challenge the implication of his analysis-that until the relief afforded by the
court in 1950 the industry had not been workably competitive. Whatever its
future, canmaking as judged by the criteria applied in this article-structure,
conduct, performance-had not met the requirements of work-able competition.
The industry's oligopolistic structure contributed to practices that led to
economically unacceptable performance.2 20
CoNCLUSIONS
If the foregoing analysis is sound, application of the principle of workable
competition under the rule of reason would obligate the courts to examine
218. McKie, supra note 215, at 506-07.
219. Hession, writing about a year earlier than McKie, was more restrained in his
evaluation of the significance of the decree. Hession, The Tin Cat Industr,, in Tun
STRUcTURE OF AEricAN INDusm"RY 43741 (Adams ed., rev. ed. 1954). So was STAiD.X
& Pooa's IxDusmy SuRvEYs, Containers C4-5 (April 21, 1955):
"The possibility that newcomers may make important inroads into the business of
large can companies is small. On the one hand, a large part of the business is done
on the basis of contracts, and, on the other, capping and sealing machinery are
leased by the companies which supply the cans, with users having the right of pur-
chase since June, 1950. In addition, plants of existing concerns generally are
strategically located in important consuming areas."
McKie of course did not base his optimism on the probable entry of newcomers other than
through backward integration of canners.
220. Whether the public interest would be better served by dissolution of American
and Continental, both of which might be brought within the prohibitions of the Sherman
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all facts relevant to determining whether a combination hinders the operation
of market forces or whether a firm is monopolizing a market; but having found
either to be the case, the courts would have no discretion in assessing the
social desirability of such hindrances or in passing on the reasonableness of ar-
rangements designed to control markets. Such an obligation, so restricted,
might have resulted in decisions adverse to the corporations here considered.
It might have led to a more, not a less, vigorous antitrust policy. It might
have brought within the purview of the Sherman Act combinations that the
1911 decisions placed beyond its reach.
But might not even the application of these principles still leave beyond
the law's reach market structures that are dominated by neither a combination
nor a monopoly but that when judged by the number and relative size of firms
and their conduct and performance do not meet the tests of workable competi-
tion? Some firms operating within an oligopolistic market structure might not
be regarded as combinations, except perhaps in an "archeological" sense; nor
as monopolies within the meaning of section 2 of the Sherman Act as inter-
preted by Judge Hand in the Aluminum case. They may have been created
originally by combining rival firms, but their growth in recent years may have
been primarily by internal expansion. How can such firms in an industry that
does not meet the tests of workable competition as herein developed be brought
within the scope of the act?
The courts, tending to look to conduct alone, have sometimes been reluctant
to disturb restrictive structures and arrangements because their origins are
"archeological." But this analysis has suggested that oligopolistic structure,
as a continuously operative fact, may be conducive to conduct and performance
that are inconsistent with the objectives of the Sherman Act. For example,
the outstanding contemporary feature of the steel industry's structure-the
existence of the United States Steel Corporation-came into being many years
ago, when the Steel Corporation was formed by the combination of numerous
originally independent firms. The Steel Corporation's overtowering size in
relation to other companies in the industry, and the relative fewness of its
rivals, have contributed to its leadership in pricing steel and to its rivals'
acceptance of that leadership; to the collective and systematic use of basing
point pricing; to collaboration in determining the average costs of extras and
in pricing them. Not only has the structure of the industry facilitated these
practices, but the practices have contributed to unacceptable industry perform-
ance. A consideration of all the circumstances at work in an industry-as the
Act should Congress see fit to incorporate the rule of reason and the principle of work-
able competition in it, is a matter of conjecture, and one's conjecture about it is apt to be
greatly influenced by his preconceptions. I believe that dissolution would re-establish an
industrial structure more consistent with the objectives of the Sherman Act. McKie, al-
though recognizing that "several firms could have been fashioned out of either of the
leaders without an appreciable loss of efficiency," and that thereafter "the market would
in time have enforced a high degree of competition," perhaps correctly concludes that
under existing law a monopoly charge could not be sustained; and as indicated above, he
believes the 1950 decrees will provide adequate remedies. McKie, supra note 215, at 507.
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rule of reason would require-should lead the courts to attach great signifi-
cance to the continuing interaction of structure and conduct in determining
the legality of the practices pursued and in shaping remedies for an industry
found not to be workably competitive. That the structure rests on old
combinations should not hallow it in the light of a law designed to assure
competitive conditions here and now.
A more realistic interpretation of the Sherman Act's prohibition of conspira-
cies in restraint of trade and of attempts to monopolize provides yet another way
of bringing oligopolistic structures that do not meet the tests of workable com-
petition within the act's reach. What business firms are up to is relevant in
determining whether they violate the law. If the sellers in a market of few firms
adopt a strategy designed to preserve the market's oligopolistic character by
blocking entry and handicapping rivals, or to substitute collective patterns
of behavior for independent decision-making, clearly they should be found
to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, as engaging in a conspiracy in re-
straint of trade. The courts might properly find a conspiracy from the total
configuration of the contracts and practices employed even though no one of
them was illegal per se. Likewise if a dominant firm pursues a course of
conduct as a result of which imports of competing products are restricted; if
patent infringement suits are used to bring would-be competitors to terms;
and if patent license agreements become the means of dividing markets, the
courts might properly find in such acts an attempt to monopolize within
section 2 of the Sherman Act. In doing so, of course, they must apply a less
rigid conception of monopoly than that advanced in Ahoninion-the firm's
control of any given percentage of the relevant market. Oligopoly is not neces-
sarily incompatible with workable competition; but when the facts establish that
it is, it should be treated like monopoly.
Where structure exerts a continuing pernicious influence on conduct, fines
and injunctions against law violators may prove inadequate to insure work-
able competition. A change in structure may be called for. Dissolution pro-
ceedings might pave the way to more acceptable industry performance. Such
proceedings should be aimed at creating not an atomistic industrial structure,
but the sort of structure that would have arisen had the firms in the industry
not resorted to competition-suppressing tactics. Penalizing bad conduct is
unlikely to reform it where an industry's structure makes it both effective and
profitable. In such situations the courts should help establish a new archi-
tecture in which restrictive practices are unlikely to be inevitable or even to
flourish.
It may be difficult to attain an interpretation and application of the concept
of workable competition as it has been expounded here. Amendment of the
law is unlikely to be the solution: many of the advocates of change apparently
hope for a gentler, not a more rigorous, application of the statutes to big
business. The concept of workable competition is vague, and differences
among experts as to its meaning are inevitable. As Mason has suggested, the
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preconceptions of the analyst as well as the facts may influence his judgment
on the competitive workability of any particular arrangement.2
2 1
If amendment of the Sherman Act is an inadequate solution, judicial broad-
ening of the act to include the concept of workable competition, however
desirable it may seem in theory, may not prove in fact a more promising
remedy. As has been pointed out, without any change in the statute the doc-
trine of workable competition is creeping into the decisions. This is strikingly
evident in Judge Leahy's decision in the Cellophane case, which reveals how
a superficial understanding of the concept and its application to a particular
set of facts may defeat the objectives of the Sherman Act. If this decision
becomes a precedent, it will be difficult to establish the existence of monopoly
in any industry confronted by rival products that for some uses may be sub-
stitutable and among which a vigorous rivalry appears to exist.
Judges no less than economists may be influenced as much by the totality
of their experience and by the institutional matrix in which they formulate
their ideas as they are by the logic of a particular situation. Judges and
economists live in an economy of big business units, and most of them have
learned to like it. Any proposal to disturb these "finely adjusted industrial
machines" would encounter serious institutional obstacles. The American
private enterprise system in the past decade and a half has earned the admira-
tion and envy of the civilized world, and many Americans have accepted the
easy explanation that giant industrial units are responsible for the gigantic
achievements of the American economy. This belief is rapidly becoming a part
of the American folklore. But in truth, the causes of the striking technological
progress in this country and of the high standards of living it has brought are
complex. The spirit of enterprise, the bold initiative of business leaders in a
general atmosphere of freedom, a technology enriched by the unhampered
achievements of scientists and engineers throughout a half-century or more,
and the expansive force of deficit financing occasioned by hot wars and a con-
tinuing cold war, have all contributed to it. In short, the recent achievement of
American capitalism is a phenomenon larger than the firms that have played
a role in it. The contemporary bigness of firms is perhaps as much an effect
as a cause of this achievement.
I believe, although I cannot prove, that the economic achievements of the
last fifteen years would have been in no way impaired and that economic
opportunities would have broadened and multiplied had business units been
somewhat smaller and more numerous-if the economy had boasted more big
firms but fewer industrial giants. And I believe that applying the concept of
workable competition as herein expounded in enforcing the antitrust laws
would have contributed to such a development. Many people will reject the
thesis that giantism in business is not the essential element in America's eco-
nomic progress-it will be least acceptable to representatives of the industrial
giants themselves. "What a dust I raise," said the fly on the chariot wheel.
221. "It seems probable that individual judgments will always be influenced to some
extent by ideological considerations." Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Prob-
lem in the United States, 62 HARv. L. Rxv. 1265, 1283 (1949).
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